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Part 8

ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE AND DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 9, 1983

Part 8

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ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE, AND DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1983

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room SB-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John Tower (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Tower, Thurmond, Goldwater, Warner, Nunn, Kennedy, and Bingaman.

Staff present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; Alan R. Yuspeh, general counsel; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel, Patrick A. Tucker, counsel, Willis D. Smith, deputy staff director and chief scientist for the minority; Ann E. Sauer, special assistant; Gerald D. Strickler, printing and documents clerk; Drew A. Harker, research assistant; L. Wayne Arny III, Richard D. Finn, Jr., George K. Johnson, Jr., James F. Locker III, David S. Lyles, José E. Martinez, Bruce D. Porter, Arnold L. Punaro, Patrick L. Renehan, and James C. Smith, professional staff members; Mary J. Kampo and Toni D. White, staff assistants.

Also present: Dennis P. Sharon, assistant to Senator Goldwater; John G. Campbell, assistant to Senator Warner; Jon Etherton, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Henry J. Steenstra, assistant to Senator Quayle, Patrick McKim and Mark J. Albrecht, assistants to Senator Wilson; Lewis G. Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon; James Steinberg, Joseph J. Kruzel, and Mike Force, assistants to Senator Kennedy; and Edward McGaffigan, Jr., assistant to Senator Bingaman.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER, PRESIDING

Senator WARNER [presiding]. Senator Tower is at the moment before the Senate Banking Committee and he asked if I would open the hearing in his absence.

This is the eighth in a series of hearings relating to the organization of the Department of Defense. This series of hearings is focused on structure, roles, and the relationship of various segments that make up the Department of Defense as well as on the relationship between the Department of Defense and other executive branch agencies.

We have with us this morning the Chiefs:

General Wickham, will you lead off in the order of seniority of the service.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN A. WICKHAM, U.S. ARMY, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

General WICKHAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

As with other Chiefs, I am pleased to be here to say a few words about some issues that I think are of importance.

I would like to put into the record my written statement and with your permission, sir, summarize that very briefly.

Senator WARNER. All the statements of the witnesses today will be incorporated in their entirety in the record.

General WICKHAM. There is no need to review before the committee all the statutory responsibilities of the Chief of Staff of the Army, but I think two of them are worth emphasis. I would like to touch briefly on them.

One of them, to the Secretary of the Army, is for the efficient operation of the Army. The Secretary of the Army is the line manager for the Secretary of Defense and his Chief of Staff is the operating manager.

As operating manager for the Army, like the other Chiefs, I am responsible for the day-to-day functioning of the Army and management of resources. But I view my key role as involving long-range direction and leadership for the Army.

As you know, the law authorizes a 4-year appointment for the Chief of Staff thereby assuring time to carry through policy changes.

My second basic responsibility is to the National Command Authority as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Now, there has been considerable debate about whether the service Chiefs can do adequate justice to both of those responsibilities. In my view, in order for a service Chief to do his work well, he needs to be a member of the Joint Chiefs and vice versa.

As a member of the JCS, the Chief of Staff of the Army is deeply involved in operational and joint planning functions. He also interfaces with unified and specified commanders and this experience provides the Chief with insight into how forces of the service should be designed, provisioned and employed.

So, service programs are thus developed with a joint perspective. By the same token, only a service Chief exercising his day-to-day responsibilities can have the essential and timely knowledge required for sound authoritative participation in deliberations of the Chiefs.

The service Chief will also insure that his service staff provides operational as well as policy support for the unified commanders who exercise operational control over the deployed forces.

Now, as for improving the effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I support the testimony of Gen. Jack Vessey before this committee on October 4. He outlined a number of changes that are underway or have been requested by legislation.

Turning to the Army's Secretariat, the Secretary of the Army, Jack Marsh, testified on November 2 outlining his view of the role of the Army Secretariat. I support the conclusions in his statement.

The Secretariat is valuable to the uniformed staff for a variety of reasons. Top members of the Secretariat generally change with each

administration and in my view, they bring expert knowledge in political and business aspects.

This infusion of new ideas is healthy. The Secretariat also contains professional civilian members who generally remain for a number of years and they provide continuity as well as historical perspective that is valuable.

All of the service Secretaries have been given broader responsibilities under Secretary of Defense Weinberger. I have seen that growth over a dozen years in the Pentagon. They are full members of the Defense Resources Board.

In fulfilling their DRB role, the service Secretaries rely on the uniformed service Chief and his military staff for advice, but in so doing they exercise policy direction over service programs.

The Secretary of the Army and his Secretariat work very closely in the Army with the uniformed staff at the action officer level as well as in important decisionmaking bodies such as the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council, which is jointly chaired; the Select Committee, which deals with policy matters, and that is jointly chaired; the Army Staff Council; and the Army Policy Council.

The Army Secretary and his Secretariat provide another important function for me as Chief. The Army Secretary is a strong civilian advocate for the Army and its role where advocacy is needed most in the public domain and in governmental organizations outside of the Department of Defense.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the current organization within the Department and more particularly within the Department of the Army basically should be kept intact. There are, of course, evolutionary changes which can and should be made to improve effectiveness.

As a final thought, I think we all recognize that we live in a very dangerous world where our national security organization must be made as effective as we possibly can make it, but it also requires that we minimize turbulence by moving with caution and deliberateness in making changes.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of General Wickham follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR., U.S. ARMY

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I am pleased to have this opportunity to share with you some views on the role of the Chief of Staff of the Army.

My views are formed by more than 11 years of service and experience on the Army Staff, the Joint Staff, and the Staff of the Secretary of Defense. They included three assignments on the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the last as Director of the Joint Staff, and Senior Military Assistant to two Secretaries of Defense.

There is no need to review for this committee all of the statutory responsibilities of Chief of Staff of the Army. Two, however, are worth emphasis. One, to the Secretary of the Army, is for the efficient operation of the Army. The Secretary of the Army is the line manager for the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of Staff is the operating manager. Both are assisted by the Vice Chief of Staff and the Army Staff, which numbers 3385 to include 1923 civilian members. This Staff, incidentally, has remained relatively constant in numbers for the past three years. As Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and now as Chief of Staff, I have resisted efforts to enlarge the Staff.

As operating manager for the Army, I am responsible for the day-to-day functioning of the Army and management of resources. However, beyond this operating responsibility lies a more fundamental one for which the Secretary of the Army and the Army as an institution look to the Chief of Staff. The key role for the Chief of Staff involves long range direction and leadership for the Army. In my view, this role places a premium on vision, focus on the future, and perserverance. The law authorizes a four-year appointment of the Chief of Staff, thereby assuring time to formulate and carry through on innovative changes, new doctrine and organization, and initiatives to improve efficiency in acquisition and management of resources.

To illustrate this fundamental role of the Chief of Staff, there are several major initiatives underway to improve the Army's fighting capabilities. One action to improve unit cohesiveness involves stabilization of personnel in units, unit rotation, and regimental affiliation. Another initiative exists with the 9th Infantry Division which serves as a high technology test bed to evaluate new doctrine, organization, and technology.

Recently the Army has taken an important new direction to strengthen its light combat forces. This is in recognition of the increasing potential for unconventional and mid-intensity conventional warfare, the necessity for rapid strategic mobility, and resource constraints. This new direction will involve addition of elite infantry units such as Ranger battalions and Special Forces. Moreover, the Army plans to convert infantry divisions into light divisions with elite infantry, lethal fighting capabilities for day and night, and high strategic mobility so that forces can be deployed and returned far more rapidly than current divisions. Initial conclusions from the operations in Grenada suggest that this new direction for Army light forces is sound and timely.

My second basic responsibility is to the National Command Authority as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I participate with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in deliberations concerning joint matters and national security issues. The Joint Staff provides staff assistance to all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

There has been considerable debate about whether the Service Chief can do adequate justice to his responsibilities as a Service Chief and as a member of the JCS. Some have argued that these responsibilities should be separated and be performed by different individuals. My view is that the responsibilities should not be separated.

In order for a Service Chief to do his work well, he needs to be a member of the JCS, and vice versa. A member of the JCS is deeply involved in operational and joint planning functions. He also works closely with the Unified and Specified Commanders. This experience provides each Chief with insight into how forces of his Service should be designed, provisioned, and employed. Service programs are thus developed from a joint perspective. This year, for example, the Army and Air Force Staffs worked closely together in developing the fiscal year 1985 budget so that joint issues would be carefully considered and reflected in service programs.

By the same token, only a Service Chief exercising his day-to-day responsibilities within his service can have the essential and timely knowledge required for sound, authoritative participation in deliberations of the JCS. The Service Chief will also insure that his Service Staff provides operational as well as policy support to the Unified Commanders, who exercise operational control over deployed forces. As a related point, the Unified Commanders can work their operational as well as resource problems through several channels. These include: the JCS; the Service components (of the Unified Commands) which would go back directly to the Service Chief; and the Defense Resources Board which receives input from the Unified Commanders during the annual Defense Department programing and budget process.

As for improving the effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I fully support the testimony of General Vessey before this committee on 4 October. He outlined a number of proposals which have been incorporated in the DOD bill submitted to both Houses of Congress on 18 April 1983. These changes should improve the overall effectiveness of the JCS in fulfilling their responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense and the President. These changes strengthen the role of the Chairman and the Joint Staff.

It is also worth remembering that breadth of experience and the working relationships among members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff make an important

difference. The current Chiefs have all served as Unified Commanders or in senior positions with Unified Commands. We have all worked closely with each other in other positions before becoming members of the JCS. Finally, all members of the JCS participate regularly in the DRB process, thereby bringing into focus not only the Service point of view but also the joint point of view, principally through the Chairman. Finally, the JCS meet weekly with the Secretary of Defense and periodically with the President.

With respect to the Army Secretariat, in recent years there have been proposals to strengthen or to eliminate the Secretariat. The current Army Secretariat which serves the Secretary of the Army, is relatively small and relies on the military staff for most of its responsibilities. In his testimony on 2 November, Secretary of the Army Marsh outlined his view of the role of the Secretariat and his conclusions as to its utility. I fully support his statement.

The Secretariat is valuable to the uniformed Staff for a variety of reasons. Top members of the Secretariat generally change with each Administration and they bring into each Department expert knowledge and advice on political and business aspects. This infusion of new ideas and experience is healthy. These top officials support the Service Secretary who has the statutory responsibility to man, train, equip and prepare our Army forces for missions directed by the National Command Authority. The Secretariat also contains professional civilian members who generally remain for a number of years. They provide continuity, as well as historical perspective, on policy matters under consideration. The Army Secretariat also provides a useful mechanism for interfacing with other civilian organizations within the Government, including the Congress.

All of the Service Secretaries have been given broader responsibility under Secretary of Defense Weinberger. They are full members of the Defense Resources Board. In this capacity they play an important role in policy determinations which affect the development of resource programs for the Department of Defense. In fulfilling their DRB role, the Service Secretaries rely on the uniformed Service Chief and the military staff; but in so doing, they exercise policy direction over Service programs.

The Secretary of the Army and his Secretariat work closely with the uniformed staff—at the action level, as well as in important decisionmaking bodies such as the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council, which is jointly presided over, the Select Committee, which deals with policy matters, the Army Staff Council, and the Army Policy Council.

The Army Secretary and his Secretariat provide another important function for me as Chief of Staff. The Army Secretary is a strong, civilian advocate for the Army and its role where advocacy is most needed in the public domain and in governmental organizations outside the Department of Defense. In addition, all military members of the Department historically have looked to the immediate civilian chain of command for policy leadership and authority over resources within DOD as well as with Congress.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the current organization within the Department of Defense and more particularly within the Department of the Army basically should be kept intact. There are, of course, evolutionary changes which can be made to improve effectiveness. As you know, some changes within the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are occuring within current statutory authority and other changes are being proposed with legislative revision.

The dangerous world in which we live requires that we make our national security organization as effective as we can. But it also requires that we minimize turbulence by moving with caution and deliberateness in making changes.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, General.

Admiral Watkins?

STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES D. WATKINS, U.S. NAVY, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral WATKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I structured my formal testimony this morning to address those specific issues I consider not sufficiently well aired in testimony given by the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Navy, Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, and my Service Chief colleagues today on the matter of reorganization and decisionmaking procedures within the Department of Defense.

I, too, am satisfied that as far as the basic organizational structure of the Department of Defense is concerned, I agree with Secretary Weinberger's and Secretary Lehman's assessment that the organizational structure is fundamentally sound and has been made more efficient with the changes Secretary Weinberger has made in the past 3 years.

His management philosophy is one of centralized policy formulation coupled with decentralized program execution balanced by an adequate policy and program oversight. I applaud this approach.

Additionally, I have previously testified along with other service Chiefs and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before House committees in July 1982 and June 1983 on issues raised concerning the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As a body we were unanimous in presenting recommendations as to what modest legislative changes were necessary to improve the ability to carry out our responsibilities under the law and, in addition, pointed out administrative changes still needed internally within the Department of Defense and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to address the confused division of labor existing between our staffs.

House bill No. 378 approved recently by the House of Representatives with some minor adjustments could be a very acceptable solution to the changes we think we need in the law.

In my formal statement today I focus on other issues that still require attention at all levels in the decisionmaking process and tend to impede effective execution of my responsibility as Chief of Naval Operations on the administrative side of the chain of command.

I point out that the problems are not so much in organizational infrastructure as in management practices and program execution. I have dedicated professionals on my staff who must return to the operating and support forces periodically and live with the results of their Washington decisions.

They strive to submit and execute a fiscally responsible, balanced budget in accordance with the defense needs that face the Nation. That budget is reviewed by the Secretary of Defense, OMB, and congressional staffs to assure an overall balance in meeting defense needs.

It is not the review so much, but the tendency by staff personnel to revise the decisions each day through the review process and to provide what I consider an excessive direction or micromanagement in the execution process.

Then it is not so much oversight as overmanagement by staffs so large that there is no consensus even within that staff. The result is waste and decreased readiness through perpetual program instability.

As a result, needed capabilities take too long to develop; delays are induced in existing programs and costs go up. Capabilities mismatches occur, flexibility disappears and we find our military continuing to move in a reactive mode through the budgetary process.

I fully support the need for oversight and management of national defense, but the level of detail and workload associated with this oversight is a matter of considerable concern.

I give an example here of the numbers of responses required to be submitted to the Congress this year alone: 245 briefings, 4,500 responses to questions for the record, 110 hearings, 37 formal reports, and so forth, and these are growing exponentially at the very time when headquarters staff are being cut.

Because we want to be responsive to the Congress, this means we fence certain personnel resources to address those issues, leaving less personnel to do the management work in a complex Navy, in turn, leaving ourselves open to accusations of fraud, waste, and abuse, only to find ourselves with another super Inspector General heaped on us to get a handle on our problems.

As OSD and congressional staffs increase, so also does the tasking levied on my staff. I point out I have inadequate top management resources now and strongly support the Secretary of Defense's proposed comprehensive flag and general legislation which would correct this problem.

It has been before the Congress 2 years and will probably not be acted on in this session.

I talk about the headquarters personnel strength cut and how in fiscal year 1984 the Defense Department Authorization Act prohibits overall growth of civilian positions by placing a ceiling on fiscal year 1984 civilian end strength. Let me give an example of what this has done in the past.

A few years ago, you will recall, in Norfolk, Va., we were found wanting in our inventory control in one of our major supply centers. It turned out that the inventory was actually there, but we didn't know it.

In the review process as to why this could happen, why this mismanagement occurred, it was agreed by all, including congressional staffs, that we needed to add 418 civilian personnel and $7 million in automatic data processing support at that center only.

We have also reviewed all of our centers nationwide and find in fiscal year 1984 we are going to need 1,500 civilians added to the other supply centers and another 13 million in ADP support. This is only indicative of the problem we face.

We are reinventing the wheel and going back and reviewing the headquarters cuts that were levied against those activities Navy-wide years ago and finding, in fact, we do need the people.

With automatic data processing support in our headquarters cut in the defense budget this year by $30 million against $109 million that was requested and $10 million additional O&M, we simply can't function.

We are caught between the rock and the hard place of reduced headquarters and reduced ADP when all other private and public management seems to be increasing their automatic data process support capability to improve management and to allow financial functions to be reviewed in real time.

There are additional congressional actions which hamper our flexibility and efficiency of program execution. Our flexibility to execute the fiscal year 1984 operations and maintenance budget is severely hampered because the appropriation is being enacted at the budget activity level with a zero service reprograming threshold.

Let me give you an example of what complications it would bring in fiscal year 1984.

This year, for example, for Lebanon operations, we were required to shift $28 million from other budget activities to accommodate that. This is what we have been doing for many years in the Navy to accommodate unforeseen contingencies.

We don't know the cost of the KAL-007 salvage operations, but they are coming out of other budget activities for which we would otherwise have to reprogram. That was done on an urgent basis. We have destroyers and amphibious ships that we were directed to be retained in service by Congress and we would like to retain those ships, but no funds were allocated. Therefore, we had to pay for the crews and operating cost of those ships out of the other budget activities.

Ship maintenance—the Congress added one overhaul ship without funds. This required rebalancing, and so on.

I view this as a very serious management restriction on the services that will not only cause more staffing but require more hearings for reprograming and the like. I think it should be deleted before the final defense appropriations bill comes before the President.

I see an increasing tendency to legislate new agencies and groups to solve every problem or work every perceived problem. The proposed DOD Test and Evaluation Agency is a prime example of yet another layer of bureaucracy.

We have seen super Inspector Generals established on top of existing organizations and we are now responding to them with response to queries beginning to equal those to the Congress.

Finally, timely enactment of the Defense Authorization and Appropriation Act prior to the start of a fiscal year is necessary if we are to properly execute the budget proposed by the President and enacted by the Congress and I think you are well aware of this.

I guess what we are asking for, Mr. Chairman, is to give us the tools to do our job, give us the management flexibility to get it done, hold line managers responsible for their actions by reducing dependence on staff for oversight and excessive policy formulation.

Good people overcome the shortfalls of most any organization. I know the Navy is managing the structure of the Navy well. The 600-ship Navy is on the way. Personnel readiness and all other readiness indicators have never been higher.

We are doing the job at sea, but we are not doing the job in Washington in the smooth flow of management processing that is essential to getting on with a better national security.

In summary, the basic organization is not the problem. We must simply move the Department of Defense away from the concept of staff management and the centralized decisionmaking that prevailed strongly in the sixties and seventies and Secretary Weinberger is doing that.

If the division of labor between staff and line functions and between policy makers and policy executors is maintained by strong leadership and a proper level of trust and accountability established, then the need for organizational changes is minimal.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Watkins follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADM. JAMES D. WATKINS, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY

Mr. Chairman, members of the committtee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss possible improvements to our defense organizational structure and to methods of operation which would permit us to provide more effectively for the Nation's security.

In previous testimony before this committee, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy testified that they believe the basic organizational structure of DOD is sound. I agree with that assessment. I am comfortable with the way the Defense Department has been working since Secretary Weinberger implemented some needed changes. I strongly support his management philosophy of centralized policy formulation, with participation by those responsible for executing policy, coupled with a decentralized approach to program execution, with frequent checks by top management. Nonetheless, there remain areas which need to be addressed in order to improve effectiveness and efficiency within DOD. Our basic problems are not so much in the organization infrastructure as in management practices and program execution.

My staff is comprised of dedicated professionals with broad operational and management expertise. These men and women subsequently return to the operating and support forces of the Navy and must live with the results of their decisions. They strive to submit and execute a fiscally responsible, balanced budget. That budget properly undergoes review by OSD, OMB, and congressional staffs to insure an overall balance in meeting defense needs. Problems arise not because of reviews, but the tendency by staff personnel to revisit decisions at each stage of the review process and to provide excessive direction or micromanage the execution process. When this occurs, we must clarify often conflicting direction.

Secretary Weinberger's statement that "Things are done best that top management checks frequently," is correct, but when oversight becomes over-management by staffs so large that there is no consensus even within that staff, then the result is waste and decreased readiness through perpetual program instability. As a result, needed capabilities take too long to develop, delays are induced in existing programs, and costs are driven up. Capabilities mismatches occur, flexibility disappears, and we find our military in a reactive mode.

I fully support the need for oversight in matters of national defense. But the level of detail and workload associated with this oversight is a matter of concern. As an example, in this calendar year my staff has prepared and submitted to Congress more than 2,900 responses to requests for information, provided 245 briefings, and submitted in excess of 4,500 responses to questions for the record that emanated out of 110 hearings. We have also been tasked to provide 37 formal reports for the authorizations committees.

As OSD and congressional staffs increase, so also does the tasking levied upon my staff; yet resources to respond to tasking are concurrently curtailed. Let me cite several areas which are of personal concern to me.

Top-level management resources. Leadership and management today is increasingly complex; yet the number of flag and general offices available to exercise that leadership is limited by long-standing congressionally imposed ceilings. As a result, we are unable to fill numerous Navy and joint-service billets which require this level of expertise because we lack the numbers. The talent is there to draw upon at lower pay grades, but these younger officers are discouraged both by future promotion opportunities, the burdens they see placed upon their seniors, and the personal uncertainties associated with constant proposals they see for change in compensation, retirement and other benefits. Civilian pursuits become increasingly attractive to all but the most dedicated. The Secretary of Defense has proposed comprehensive Flag and General Legislation which would correct this problem. This legislation, resubmitted in May 1983, is a permanent, rational method for flag and general officer management and would be extremely helpful to me in insuring better leadership, management and oversight of our Navy.

Headquarters personnel strength. There has been continued tight control of overall civilian end strength with special emphasis on the size of so-called Headquarters staffs. Yet these Headquarters personnel, military and civilian, are precisely those who must carry out day-to-day management and oversight of our complex procurement, training and logistics support functions. They must answer those questions posed by steadily increasing reviewing staffs with OSD and Congress. Their numbers must be adequate to the task or the tasking must change if

we are to satisfy our mutual concerns for proper management and oversight of scarce resources and reduce instances of fraud, waste, or abuse. The fiscal year 1984 DOD Authorization Act prohibits overall growth of civilian positions by placing a ceiling on fiscal year 1984 civilian end strength equal to fiscal year 1983. These civilians are desperately needed to adequately staff critical positions in our growing Navy.

Included in the Act was a provision to reduce Headquarters strength by five percent, resulting in a revised fiscal year 1984 Headquarters ceiling below the fiscal year 1983 budgeted level. This reduction in military and civilian positions defies logic and hampers our ability to get the job done right.

Adequate ADP support. This is essential to our ability both to carry out day-to-day control of our far-flung organization and to improve such areas as personnel and pay accounting and inventory control—areas of mutual concern to me and to the Congress. The fiscal year 1984 Authorization Act reduced our constrained ADP budget of $109 million by $30 million in procurement and $10 million in O&MN. I understand an additional $10 million appropriations mark is also contemplated. These large reductions are made at a time when private and public management is increasing its ADP capabilities to improve management and financial functions and to improve productivity. We need this ADP capability.

I would like to comment briefly on several additional congressional actions which hamper our flexibility and efficiency in program execution.

Our flexibility to execute the fiscal year 1984 Operations and Maintenance budget is severely hampered because the appropriation is being enacted at the budget activity level with a zero service reprogramming threshold. Thus, congressional approval is required before programming is possible between budget activities in our operating accounts. These restrictions on our authority to transfer funds within these accounts greatly reduce our operational flexibility and ability to manage effectively, they unnecessarily tax the resources of all staffs both here in Congress and within DOD.

I see an increasing tendency to legislate new agencies or groups to solve every problem, or worse, every perceived problem. The proposed DOD Test and Evaluation agency is a prime example of yet another layer of bureaucracy. Rather than holding accountable those who now have responsibility for Test and Evaluation functions, we are about to unnecessarily reorganize.

Finally, timely enactment of Defense Authorization and Appropriations Acts prior to the start of a fiscal year is necessary if we are to properly execute the budget proposed by the President and enacted by Congress.

There are ready solutions to the issues I have outlined. They are basically:

Give us the tools to do our job.

Give us the management flexibility to get it done.

Hold line managers responsible for their actions by reducing dependence upon staffs for oversight and policy formulation.

Your action to address these areas of concern would far outweight the impact of any departmental reorganization in improving our capabilities.

Secretary Weinberger has moved to centralize policy formulation and decentralize the execution of these policies. I believe that such a philosophy, fully applied, more than any DOD organizational change, can best improve the effectiveness of the Defense Department.

I would like to make a final observation. Good people will overcome the shortfalls of most any organization. The current DOD decisionmaking structure works because we have outstanding and dedicated men and women working hard and extraordinarily long hours to carry out their mission. They would make nearly any organizational structure work because they believe in the work that must be done. Many have said that we in the Defense Department lack the management capability to oversee an undertaking such as the administration's naval recovery program. I disagree. The 600-ship Navy is well on its way. Accompanying the expansion of the force structure has been an increasing recruitment of high quality personnel. Existing forces have been made ever more ready. As an example, today we are maintaining the highest levels of personnel readiness I have seen in my 34 years of Navy service. Most indices are up! In just three years we have seen a 30 percent improvement in submarine readiness, a 38 percent improvement in surface ship readiness, and a 42 percent improvement in aviation readiness. During that same time period, first-term enlisted retention shot up by 19 percent and second-term retention climbed by nearly 18 percent. Bright-eyed youngsters are now coming to us

with a real interest in military careers. Our war on drugs has been remarkably successful, with drug usage cut by more than one-half in just two years. Even our toughest problem areas of the past—such as desertion and unauthorized absenteeism—are on the decline. Our sailors and marines are more skilled. Morale is high. Moreover, we have clearly demonstrated that we can manage the naval recovery effectively, with many elements delivered ahead of schedule and under budget.

In summary, the basic organization of DOD is not the problem. We must simply move the Department of Defense away from the concept of staff management and centralized decisionmaking that prevailed so strongly through the sixties and seventies and resulted in the buildup of large staffs in OSD and the Congress. If the division of labor between staff and line functions and between policy makers and policy executors is maintained by strong leadership, a proper level of trust and accountability, then the need for organizational change is minimal. I applaud Secretary Weinberger's actions to centralize policy formulation and decentralize execution. In additional to his management initiatives, I believe the dedication of our hard working personnel is the key to success. Our accomplishments in rebuilding the national defense speak for themselves. Give us the tools, the trust and the latitude to execute this highly complex task of defending the nation and let us get on with the job.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, Admiral.

General Gabriel?

STATEMENT OF GEN. CHARLES A. GABRIEL, U.S. AIR FORCE, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

General GABRIEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate this opportunity to testify before your committee this morning about this most important subject, organization and decisionmaking procedures in DOD.

I agree, Mr. Chairman, with what you have said about it. There are few issues that are as important to national security as this one.

I would like to just support some of the things that General Wickham and Admiral Watkins have said. I agree with the testimony of the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense that the organizational structure of DOD is sound.

I was here, as you know, with Admiral Watkins as a member of the Chiefs when we put together the JCS organization; the few modest changes that we have in mind we have already proposed; and as General Wickham has said, we do support the Chairman and what he testified to here on that subject.

I would also like to support General Wickham's comment about the advantage of dual-hatting, as a service Chief and a member of the JCS.

I think it is very obvious from what he has said and our experience that you are a better service Chief because you are a member of the JCS and you are a better member of the JCS because of your service responsibilities. With dual-hatting you establish the joint strategy and make sure the forces you develop are going to meet that joint strategy.

Also, what Admiral Watkins said about Navy O&M I could not support more. ADP, if I can give you one example. In the late fifties and early sixties the services—the Air Force in particular—at that time were pretty much in the lead in this country in computers.

We tried back in the early seventies to upgrade those computers; we needed to. Today it is a disgrace that we have not been able to enhance and improve the computers that we have.

For example, the Logistics Command at Wright-Patterson has parts and spares, literally many millions of items that we have to keep coming into the force to support what we have. We do batch processing there; it takes 70 to 75 days to run a batch through. On an ABC–TV program just this morning there were comments about the Air Force and Army ADP capabilities.

The Air Force produces millions of pounds of computer cards every year, and as everybody should know, computer cards are not the product of today's technology in computers. We don't need all of that.

What you could do here 20 years ago with a roomful of computers, like this room, you can do the same job with a machine you hold in your hand. We do need to upgrade—our present capability is slowing us down. I support the rationale Admiral Watkins just gave about why we have not been able to improve our capability.

In addition, O&M is the lifeblood of the services. We are not going to be able to get the most out of what we have in the field if we don't continue to support it. That is the best return for your money, I think.

Mr. Chairman, I would just like to focus the few comments I have today on the relationships among the defense elements that we work with daily: the JCS, the line of Chiefs in the field, the Secretary of Defense, and the President.

In working with the CINC's, I think we have made good progress in the last year and a half, at least since General Vessey became Chairman. We bring the CINC's in to tell us how they would fight their war in their own theaters. They have done that individually, they have done that collectively. It had never been done before. So, we are concentrating on war fighting and deterrence. If the war starts in your theater, how would you operate? If a war starts in another place, how would you operate, given these numbers of forces?

It has taught the CINC's a lot, it has taught us a lot. It has taught the CINC's to better appreciate the lack of resources we have to deal with here and the kind of decisions we have to make.

It has taught us the problems they have in the field and the kind of hard judgments we would have to make if we had simultaneous operations around the world.

Next, the relationship among the Chiefs. I won't dwell on that. I think you all have heard about what the Air Force has been doing with the Navy in terms of operating the F–15's and AWAC's on exercises, training and personnel exchanges.

It is routine now for the F–15's and AWAC's to work with carrier task forces any place in the world. You don't have to fumble around for frequencies. You know what you are doing when you get there.

It is also routine for B–52's to work with the Navy—mine laying, sea surveillance and other missions. For the first time we have fired Harpoon missiles off B–52's.

So, there is good cooperation. There is much less parochialism among the services than I have ever seen before, although you do need some advocacy.

In Army-Air Force cooperation, General Wickham and I worked up budgets together this year in putting together the POM. I had somebody sitting in on his deliberations. He had somebody sitting in on ours.

We're cooperating in other ways as well. In a conventional war we would have to work together behind the point of contact. As a matter of fact, right now we have a pretty heavy effort ongoing to take a look at that point of contact and divide the area beyond it into bands and see just what the threat is back there, what we need to do, what the Army's capabilities are and what ours might be today, what he is trying to bring in and what we are trying to bring in, to see where we are bumping together and where we can do it better—a more affordable approach to get the job done better.

That is the kind of cooperation you ought to know about. We do work very closely together, and I think it is important that we continue.

The final area is how well we work with the Secretary of Defense and the President.

Of course, the Secretary of Defense is key to the whole operation. How well do we serve him? We do get good visibility with him and the President.

The Chiefs normally meet with the Secretary twice a week. Of course, sometimes more on special issues.

He has brought, as General Wickham mentioned, the service Secretaries into the DRB and has given them an important role in that process. The DRB has improved a great deal because of that.

The service Chiefs give inputs and support to the service Secretaries as well as to the Chairman in those deliberations.

The CINC's now, as you know, come in several times to tell their stories to the DRB so that they can better make decisions on the resources allocations.

Finally, with the President, I think most of you also know that we, as a body, have probably met with him more than any other group of Chiefs I know of, and we have very candid exchanges. We have openly discussed with him our views on all the important issues. We have no complaints about that. I don't think he does.

I believe we have made some good improvements over the last couple of years. But we are not inhibited by lack of opportunity to improve things. There is always a better way to do business.

I agree with Jim Watkins that the improvements needed are basically not in the organization, but in the way we go about our business. There are some things we can do to improve the way we operate with Congress as well as within DOD. We certainly appreciate, Mr. Chairman, what you are doing here, to smoke it all out and have us all together to talk about the big picture and not just the JCS.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Gabriel follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. CHARLES A. GABRIEL, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this committee's hearings on the organization and decisionmaking procedures of the Department of Defense. I agree with Chairman Tower's statement, when he announced these hearings, that "there are few issues as important to our national security as the organization and relationships of the defense elements of the executive branch and our military and whether such organization facilities or impedes effective decisionmaking." This committee has already heard a wide range of views, and will hear many others in the

coming weeks. Rather than focusing on statutory and regulatory responsibilities of defense organizations—subjects you have already dealt with—I'd like to describe the relationships among the defense elements I work with on a daily basis.

After sixteen months as Chief of Staff of the Air Force and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am more convinced than ever that these roles are essentially linked and complementary. They are not in conflict. In short, you're a better Chief because you're a member of the JCS and a better member of the JCS because of your Service responsibilities. It is the dual role that links and integrates joint strategic planning with Service responsibilities for organizing, training, and equipping forces. Wearing the two hats of Service Chief and JCS member, I am in a better position to assure that the joint strategy for the military forces and Air Force programs match up with defense objectives provided by civilian leadership. Working closely with Secretary Orr, I insure that Air Force programing and budgeting efforts are directed toward obtaining required military capabilities within fiscal constraints. Of course, no system is perfect, and we always seek improvements in this process.

This has been a significant year for the JCS. We're doing business in new and better ways. I think my fellow JCS members agree that we are a cohesive group under General Vessey and that we have excellent rapport with Secretary Weinberger and the President. With a full plate of issues before us, we've been working hard to give the Secretary of Defense and the President the best military advice possible—before it's requested. We meet with Secretary Weinberger weekly in the Armed Forces Policy Council and in scheduled JCS meetings. We also meet regularly with President Reagan to receive his direction and give him our candid military advice.

As JCS members, we're focusing our efforts on planning how best to fight if it becomes necessary. Over the past year, the Commanders-in-Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands have come in to discuss their contingency war plans—including force capabilities and shortfalls. This helps us in our Service roles, and it gives the CINCs a greater appreciation of the competing demands for limited resources.

We've also taken a long, hard look at improvements we could make ourselves in the JCS. For example, we set up a rotation system in which each JCS member serves for a three-month period as Acting Chairman during any absence of the Chairman. This practice works well and provides good continuity. It gives each of us a greater appreciation for General Vessey's responsibilities and the inner workings of the joint staff. We've recommended other changes to the Secretary of Defense and to the President. You have already heard testimony from Secretary Weinberger, General Vessey, and the Service Secretaries on a number of proposals, including those in the bill passed by the House of Representatives a few weeks ago. In my view, each proposed change has to be carefully evaluated—especially for its effect on force readiness and capability.

I want to take this opportunity to expand briefly on an important provision of the House bill to reorganize the JCS. As you know, the provision placing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the chain of command was also included in the DOD-sponsored legislative package. This provision would not change the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense or challenge civilian control. Nor would it jeopardize the JCS as a corporate body. However, it is important to distinguish between upward and downward communications. The "up channel," from the CINCs to SecDef, should pass through the JCS. This would allow the Chiefs, who are charged with supporting the CINCs, to provide their corporate views to the Secretary of Defense or the President on matters that affect our Nation's security. However, once the NCA has made a decision, activation of the "down channel"—directing the execution of the decision—can, and should, be done by the Chairman. There is no need for the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body to be involved in communicating decisions to the unified and specified commands. I believe placing the Chairman in the chain of command would make explicit his function as a link between the SecDef and the CINCs, a de facto arrangement which already works well.

As Chief of Staff, I look to Secretary Orr to provide civilian guidance, oversight, and control in fulfilling Department of the Air Force responsibilities to organize, train, and equip air forces for their role in national security. The Secretary looks to me for military advice and the implementation of Air Force policies, plans, and programs. The Air Staff and the Secretariat cooperate on a whole range of matters concerning the effectiveness of the Air Force—from

working with OSD on the development of the Defense Guidance through the entire cycle of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System. With the Service Secretaries now sitting as members of the Defense Resources Board—and the Chiefs backing up the Secretaries and General Vessey—there are excellent opportunities for the Services and the JCS to participate in the decision-making process.

I also look to Secretary Orr for specific policy and program guidance in his coordinating role between the office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air Force. He is well situated to present our views to OSD in the policy development process while keeping the Nation's defense needs uppermost—much the same way Service Chiefs act within the JCS structure.

This is how I see the defense elements relating to one another on a daily basis. These relationships are more important than formal organization charts. You could have on paper the best organization the human mind can devise, and there still would be no certainty that it would work well in the real world. Does the present system work? My answer is yes, and despite its enormity and complexity it works well. Can the system be improved? Yes, of course. OSD, JCS, the Services, and the civilian Secretariats have made meaningful changes. We continue to look at other recommendations that might help us in the complex job of ensuring this nation has the strong and ready forces we need to deter aggression and meet national commitments.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, General Gabriel.

General Kelley, you probably have had a gut full of congressional testimony in the last few days.

We are glad to have you back. We hope this will be your last appearance here for a while so you can go back to the Marine Corps.

STATEMENT OF GEN. PAUL X. KELLEY, U.S. MARINE CORPS, COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General KELLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It has been a handful. However, it has been an essential part of the great process that all of us sitting at the table have sworn to support and defend.

I thank you for giving me the opportunity this past week.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, this is my first appearance before the Congress on this subject. Therefore in my remarks today, I will focus exclusively on the roles and the functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the military services.

First and foremost, I honestly believe that the existing JCS structure is basically sound. It provides a forum for free and open discussion of the issues, consideration of different views and unique perspectives of all of the services, development and evaluation of alternative courses of action, and deliberate formulation of comprehensive military advice. Unanimity in providing this advice is not required. In fact, on occasion the best advice may well be a set of alternatives for consideration by the National Command Authorities.

In addition to providing this advice, we provide the strategic guidance and direction to the Unified and Specified Commands. We do this with the perspective that we, as the heads of our respective services, also provide to these Commands their warfighting capability—properly trained and equipped forces. No other proposed system possesses that inherent accountability, that critical and essential link between authority and responsibility.

I do recognize, however, that some form of change in the JCS organization is inevitable and, perhaps, desirable to improve our effective-

ness. The Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves are continuing to evaluate ways to better perform our functions in support of the Secretary, the President, the Nation, and the Congress, and, of course, we will take all the necessary measures to implement any and all of these improvements.

I cite recent proposals, which I support, to remove the statutory restrictions on the Joint Staff which, if enacted, will have a very positive impact on the ability of the Joint Staff to better support the Joint Chiefs. On the other hand, I do not believe that major legislative overhaul of the JCS system is needed.

Let me address the current legislative initiatives, particularly those in the Nichols bill which was passed recently by the House of Representatives, which would increase significantly the role and functions of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If many of these proposed changes are enacted as written, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although nominally retained as the principal military advisers to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, could become impotent in a practical sense. The Chairman could become the single Chief of Staff of our Armed Services. The result, I believe, would be the isolation of the National Command Authorities from legitimate alternative and leveling points of view provided only by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Previously enacted legislation has emphasized consistently the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body and the functions of this corporate body as planning and advising, not commanding.

When the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff speaks it should be understood without equivocation that it is on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body, unless caveated appropriately. For example, any and all initiatives that place the Chairman in the chain of command or on the National Security Council should state explicitly that he would, in these positions, be acting on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Therefore, I recommend that any language of any proposed legislation be clarified in all cases that the Chairman is acting for the corporate body. Without this emphasis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as we know it today, could eventually cease to function as an effective corporate body.

I endorse the views of the Secretary of the Navy last week on the role and functions of service Secretaries in their relationship with the service Chiefs. The service Secretaries and their staffs are essential to maintaining and exercising civilian control over the military services.

I believe that I have had considerable experience over my career in allocating resources, and it is my view that the responsibility for resource allocation is presently being discharged most effectively by the services. On the other hand, the Joint Staff in representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff may become more involved in this arena at the macro level as a result of the increasing number of joint and cross-service programs.

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by emphasizing what I think is clearly the most important point when addressing any defense reorganization issue. In the final analysis, it is the quality of and the chemistry between the individual members of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff—not necessarily the organizational mechanics—that will finally determine the effectiveness of the corporate body. Overall, our current system, which is based on the principle of civilian control with its inherent accountability, is capable of serving this Nation well, both now and in the future. Finally, as current proposals—legislative or otherwise—involving the Joint Chiefs of Staff are considered by this committee, I urge that you examine them in light of maintaining the role and the influence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Kelley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. PAUL X. KELLEY, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee: Since 1947, the defense establishment has evolved gradually, but methodically, into an extremely competent and responsive organization. For this reason, I hope that any future organization changes would not create obstacles to the individual authority and accountability of senior defense officials, both civilian and military.

In my remarks today, I will focus on the role and functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the military services.

First of all, I truthfully believe that the existing JCS structure is essentially sound. It provides a forum for free and open discussion of the issues, the consideration of different views and unique perspectives of all the services, the development and evaluation of alternative courses of action, and the deliberate formulation of comprehensive military advice. The advice developed in this manner serves as a sound basis for our civilian leadership to make those decisions that only they are charged with making. Unanimity in providing this advice is not required and should not be the ultimate criterion. The best advice may well be a set of alternatives for consideration by the National Command Authorities. Our current system encourages this approach, as well as permitting us to forward an independent view which may differ from the majority. In making their decisions, the Secretary of Defense and the President should have the best military advise possible, and must not be prohibited systematically from receiving that advice from those best qualified to give it.

In addition to providing advice to the National Command Authorities, we are responsible for providing the strategic guidance and direction to the combatant forces, the unified and specified commands. We do this with the perspective that we, as heads of our respective Services, are also responsible for providing to these commands their warfighting capability—the properly trained and equipped forces with which to carry out the direction we have given as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. No other proposed system can possess that inherent accountability, that critical and essential link between authority and responsibility.

However, as with almost all organizations, there will always be room for some improvement in effectiveness. I do recognize that some form of change to the JCS organization is inevitable and indeed desirable. In fact, over the past year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have looked long and hard at ways to improve their functioning. Previous proposals for change have been evaluated thoroughly. In some cases, internal policies and procedures have already been modified and, as you know, legislative changes were recommended by this administration in April 1983. We are continuing to evaluate additional ways to better perform our functions in support of the Secretary, the President and the Nation—to improve our warfighting ability, to provide better and more timely advice, to better meet the CINC's requirements, and to more effectively and efficiently apply our resources—and we will take the necessary measures to implement improvements.

To illustrate our attempts to improve the effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I cite the recent proposals, which I support, to remove the statutory restrictions on the Joint Staff. If enacted, this minor legislative change will have a positive impact on the ability of the Joint Staff to better support the JCS. On the other hand, I do not believe that major legislative overhaul of the JCS system is needed. Radical systematic changes would not serve to improve effectiveness,

produce better military advice, or enhance this Nation's security. Overall, our current system, based on the principle of civilian control with its inherent accountability, is capable of serving this nation well, both now and in the future.

Let me now emphasize what I think is clearly the most important point when addressing defense reorganization issues. Unfortunately, this point most often becomes lost during organizational arguments. Mr. Chairman, quite frankly, it doesn't matter how well the Defense Department, the military departments, the Services or the Joint Chiefs of Staff are organized. What matters most is the quality of the people who serve our country in these organizations which, in the final analysis, is the critical and ultimate key to organizational effectiveness.

The individual quality and the chemistry between the individual members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including the Chairman, will determine the functional effectiveness of the corporate body. So it is between the senior civilian and military officials in the Defense Department. Therefore, the quality of the leaders involved far outweighs the organizational mechanics in insuring success within the system.

Let me address briefly the current legislative initiatives which would increase significantly the role and functions of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These initiatives are contained in two proposed bills—the administration bill of April 1983 and the Nichols bill (H.R. 3718) which was passed recently by the House of Representatives.

Candidly, Mr. Chairman, if many of these proposed changes are enacted as written, particularly those in the Nichols bill, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although nominally retained as the principal military advisors to the President, Secretary of Defense and National Security Council, could, I emphasize could, become impotent in a practical sense. In effect, we would set ourselves on an inexorable path whereon the Chairman inevitably could become the single Chief of Staff of our Armed Forces. It may be nominally efficient from a managerial standpoint, but it is dangerous from the point of view of balanced military advice on the vital issues of national security.

An analysis of the intent of Congress as contained in the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 shows that the establishment of a single Chief of Staff is prohibited because the concentration of power in one military man would violate the existing principles of civilian control of the military now exercised through the Secretary of Defense.

If the proposed initiatives are taken literally, a future Chairman conceivably could prevent minority or majority views on military problems from reaching the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, or the President. The result, I believe, would be the isolation of the National Command Authorities from legitimate alternative and leveling points of view provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As I have stressed previously, by law and by background, we provide expertise and responsibility for military strategy during our deliberations. As Service Chiefs, we bear the responsibility for preparing and providing resources for the forces that must respond to the unified commanders for the plans, policies, and direction issued by the President and the Secretary of Defense.

Previously enacted legislation consistently emphasized the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body and the functions of this corporate body as planning and advising, not commanding.

When the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff speaks, it should be understood unequivocally that it is on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body, unless caveated appropriately. Therefore, I recommend that the language of any proposed legislation be clarified in all cases such that the Chairman is acting on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For example, any and all initiatives to place the Chairman in the chain of command should state explicitly that he would, in this position, be acting on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, I can find no reason from a military viewpoint not to support a proposal which would make the Chairman a permanent member of the National Security Council. However, I would stress that any law in this regard should also emphasize, without equivocation, that such membership is not as an individual, but as a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting on their behalf. Without this emphasis, the JCS would eventually cease to function as an effective corporate body.

I endorse the view espoused by the Secretary of the Navy last week on the role and functions of the Service Secretaries and their relationships with their Service

Chiefs. The Service Secretaries and their staffs are essential to maintaining and exercising civilian control over the military services. I adhere 100 percent to this concept and to the organizational structure of the military departments which currently exists. I can honestly say that my staff and I have an excellent working relationship with Secretary Lehman and his staff, which has contributed significantly to managerial efficiency and effectiveness within the Department of the Navy.

Each Service Chief is directly responsible to his Service Secretary (and ultimately to the Secretary of Defense) for the planning, programing, and budgeting functions which result in the fielding of ready and sustainable combat forces for employment by the CINCs. A detailed knowledge of Service-unique programs, coupled with a sound understanding of deployment and employment techniques, is required to develop credible, efficient force packages. This ability is resident within the individual Services and is exercised continuously. It is my view that the responsibility for resource allocation is being discharged effectively by the Services. On the other hand, the Joint Staff in representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff will become more involved in this arena in the future as a result of expanding technology and increased sophistication in weapons and communications systems. This involvement by the Joint Staff at the macro level will be necessary to insure the success of the increasing number of joint and cross-service programs.

Let me conclude by emphasizing four points:

1. The present JCS structure, with the full and equal representation of all Services, subject to the clear and undisputed authority of civilian leadership, is a sound and effective design for our national security.

2. The military department and service structure is essential to the concept of civilian control and should be retained intact.

3. The military services through the Service Secretaries are implementing the PPBS effectively.

4. Finally, good sound leadership is the key ingredient to a successful defense organization and decision making process.

As current proposals (legislative or otherwise) involving the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its Chairman are considered by you, I urge that you examine them in light of maintaining the role and influence of the JCS as a corporate body.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, General Kelley.

I had the privilege of being in Grenada last Sunday and of talking to people in positions of command in all four of our services.

In spite of some flaws and glitches in the operation, one thing that strikes me is that this was almost a textbook example of how a joint operation should work. All four services involved, I think, did an outstanding job.

It was organized on rather short notice, and I think the implementation of it was very professional. Any intimations of inter-service rivalry, protection of turf, and differences of opinion, were subordinated to the greater goal of a successful operation.

It was, in my view, very well done. There are a few questions involved in that operation and I think the committee wants to get some answers to them, but on the whole I think we have to regard this as an extremely well-implemented operation.

I would like you to comment on the extent to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff were involved in the planning and operation with regard to the chain of command aspect of this operation.

I will ask Admiral Watkins first since Admiral McDonald was tasked to head up the entire operation.

So, let me first ask Admiral Watkins to comment on it and to explain to the committee how this thing worked. Then I will solicit comments from the other three members.

Admiral WATKINS. Mr. Chairman, we were deeply involved within the 48- to 72-hour period prior to the operation.

We had numerous meetings of the Joint Chiefs, some executive sessions for the more sensitive issues involved, some with the Unified Commander brought up from Norfolk to review his draft plan, some with our special forces people in the Army that enlightened us with some of their concepts of operations.

As a matter of fact, the members of the Joint Chiefs made some recommendations on what we thought would improve the Unified Commander's concept in view of the time involved, the need for simplistic command and control, the need for simplistic separation of forces where we didn't have time to do training operations.

This was all done, agreed to by the Unified Commander and the other principal subordinate Commanders that had to work for him and carry out this operation on such short notice.

We were all thoroughly apprised of the intelligence that was available for the operation. It was meager. It is one of the great national problems to deal with the lack of human intelligence; a capability we have allowed to deteriorate in prior years.

Hopefully with the new Executive order of the present administration we will get on with a more aggressive, active human intelligence program worldwide where we have potential hot trouble spots so that we can get in there ahead of time instead of waiting until it is almost too late to get the kind of detailed information we need.

We made the force size estimate, essentially doubling it for lack of good intelligence information. When people criticize the number of forces when we go into areas of unknown potential problems, they should understand that we like to have adequate forces so that we never find ourselves behind the power curve in that regard.

I can't recall a more intensive involvement in the year and a half I have been Chief of Naval Operations. It was every bit as significant as our actions prior to the hostage rescue attempt that was aborted, as you know, in Iran.

My feeling is that there were no signs at any time that I could detect of an inter-service rivalry issue: who wants to take the high ground, et cetera.

The issue of command and control was queried at great length by the Chiefs and we were convinced that the contingency plan that the Unified Commander had developed to set up a special joint task force rapidly was a good plan. It was executed.

The Commander of the 2d Fleet turned out to be Commander of Task Force 120 and had a very fine Army general as his subordinate on one side and a very fine Marine officer on the other side.

I don't think any of us ever felt that there was a question that command and control was well executed.

We were also concerned about the ground interface between the Army ground commander and Marine ground commander, but that was solved by the simplistic separation of forces concept and it turned out we did not have any significant command and control problems. That really is where we find so much potential difficulty in these short fuse plans.

So, I can say that our involvement was heavy, we were linked with the chain of command all the way. We were addressing the many political, potentially political, issues in trying to insure that our liaison with the State Department and with the National Security Coun-

cil was a closed loop so that we were fully ready to deal with all of the other kinds of problems that we expected we might find under the unusual circumstances in Grenada.

I think all of us feel good about that effort that we put into this under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs who did a superb job, in my opinion, in keeping us pulled together, keeping the meeting going, keeping chain of command fully advised, the interagency group fully advised, and I believe the National Security Council was well served by us on the military side.

Chairman TOWER. General Wickham?

General WICKHAM. I echo what Admiral Watkins has said, sir.

I have been in the system for a number of crises from the *Mayaguez* incident to this current operation and others in between.

This, as you pointed out, was a kind of textbook sort of thing done in a short time. The Joint Chiefs were deeply involved in it, not in an overmanagement, micromanagement way, but more in terms of legitimate and intelligent oversight. Our concerns were to keep it simple, because there wasn't time to let it get complicated, and are we providing the right kind of resources? Are we drawing on the best intelligence available? Can we do more?

It was in a helpful mode. We talked to the commanders, as Jim said.

To add a couple of points, we tried to keep it simple because of the limited time available to execute. We did use the existing chain of command. There was no jerry rigging. I think that fact testifies to the responsiveness of the existing unified structure. It can take on a crisis, do the necessary joint planning to handle joint forces that are assigned including forces which have not worked together, and to go and conduct an operation in a simple and clean way.

Sure, there are some lessons that we are learning still about how to do something like this better in the way of preliminary training and in the way perhaps of cross exchange of communications and liaison people, but I think that your overview statement in the beginning was right.

It was a good operation, we ought to take credit for it in terms of force readiness and the ability to work together in a joint way.

Chairman TOWER. General Kelley?

General KELLEY. I have no further comment to make, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. General Gabriel?

General GABRIEL. I would like to support your comment about the Grenada operation avoiding inter-service rivalry.

When the troops are getting shot at, the doctrinal issues seem to fade away pretty fast.

Another reason we didn't have that was the civilian leadership showed good confidence in the military. They did not interfere. They gave us a job to do; they stayed out of it. There was no micromanagement in this one. We appreciate that.

Then there is always a balance between operational security and communications security. The best intelligence and planning needs lead time.

As you know, we had little time to plan and get intelligence. As Admiral Watkins said, we had no intelligence buildup because of the lack of HUMINT.

I was especially proud of our CPSEC and COMSEC.

There might have been bruised feelings along the way, but the troops got in and did the job. It is really great, not only for the military but for the country, to pull an operation like this off and succeed and win.

SIZE OF THE DEPLOYED FORCE

Chairman TOWER. Thank you.

Let me just address myself to one question raised by Admiral Watkins.

There has been some implied criticism in the press of the fact we utilized some 6,000 people. In the event it turns out perhaps we could have done it with less, I think I understand it, but it is good to have it spelled out for us.

Give the rationale for using more force than even you think may have been required. In fact, what would the ultimate result have been if we had only put a couple of battalions in, for instance, and would it have taken us longer to accomplish the objective? Would this have resulted in more casualties?

If this could be spelled out, Admiral Watkins.

Admiral WATKINS. Mr. Chairman, I will start out and then I would like to pass the microphone here to General Wickham who I think can probably add to my comment since a large number were Army personnel.

When we went into this operation we had a very special mission, to minimize the loss of life. That means a great deal to the planner. We didn't bomb Grenada from 30,000 feet. We didn't level the buildings.

We could have gone in without one soldier, sailor or marine casualty, in my opinion, and devastated a beautiful little resort. That was not our goal.

Our goal was to do what we could to accomplish our mission without loss of lives of either our military personnel or more importantly those of innocent civilians including the Cubans.

We sent an admonishment to Cuba saying: "We are not interested in shooting your people. Please don't shoot back at us and there won't be a problem."

When you have that kind of mission assignment, you must assign large numbers to walk through the streets, ferret out the individual snipers and minimize collateral damage. That was foremost in the mind of the commander all the time, to take more forces and in general save more lives of our service people and save the lives of innocent civilians.

It was a good mission. It takes large numbers and they have to come in sequentially so that at any one time we could have optimal numbers in there, depending on what the first forces did and how fast we could bring them back to the continental United States.

My feeling is that we had a force sized for the unknown. It was about double that which we might have had if we had had special and good solid validated intelligence.

So, perhaps in hindsight, yes, we might have done it with less, but I think that is a weak grist from the mill in the aftermath of this and the Monday morning quarterbacking that goes on.

Certainly if we had had inadequate forces, it would have been all over the front page.

General WICKHAM. We did not want to send a boy to do a man's job. We had a paucity of intelligence and there is good reason for that. We didn't plan such an operation here in Grenada, hence intelligence preparation was inadequate.

There has been a reduction of cur human intelligence gathering capability over the years. We need to look carefully at what needs to be done to rebuild that to where it should be.

The size of the force, as Jim Watkins indicated, was also related to the nature of the operation. We needed to put forces in sequentially, early reconnaissance teams to go in to see what the status of the beaches would be or status of obstacles on the runway would be.

We had to put in sufficient forces after those early reconnaissance teams to be able to move swiftly so that we could free Americans before they might become hostages. We didn't want to get tied up in fire-fights with unknown resistance elements and then have the operation be dragged out. We could bypass and move quickly.

Also the nature of the operation in terms of coming in at roughly the same time in different locations, the Marines up north and the Army Rangers in the south, made sense in terms of moving quickly to deal with resistance around the whole island and to end it quickly.

We also had PSYOP's capabilities, loudspeakers from the air and leaflet drops to the Grenadian civilians as well as to the Cubans there and to the PRA, the military, Grenadian military, to urge them to stop fighting and to do things that would lead to safety of noncombatants.

That calls for additional people. There, of course, were people offshore on ships that could be used in support, so if you count the whole group, it does look large, but those that actually functioned on the ground are relatively modest in relationship to the threat as it emerged.

As I said earlier, we ought to take credit for success. We pulled this thing off with a minimum of casualties against some pretty fierce fighting.

I have talked with dozens of these young men in the hospital and let me tell you those who are wearing Purple Hearts were not up against just simple soldiers.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you.

My time has expired.

Senator Nunn?

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I again thank you for focusing on this very important subject of departmental organization. I think our witnesses this morning not only have given us their views in that respect, but also broadened it to include some of the impediments that relate to the congressional process which I very much appreciate.

I think we do have to take a broad look at particularly how we function and how we may be driving the system. Before we get into that main subject, just a couple of points on the Grenada situation.

First, I want to join you in congratulating the Joint Chiefs for planning and helping carry out an operation that was without any doubt a success and I agree with General Wickman's statement we ought to take credit for that success.

I am proud of the Joint Chiefs and also proud of the men who participated in protecting American interests.

I do think we have to look at possible areas for improvement and I would like my questions to be taken in that vein.

ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE ATTACK

The Washington Times today, November 9, has a paragraph in here on the front page which says:

> In addition, American Military Commanders were not aware that the State Department gave the Cuban Government in Havana several hours of advanced notice of the attack.

Two questions.

One, is that true?

General Wickman, I would ask you that question or any other member who wants to volunteer.

Did the State Department actually tell the Cubans we were going to attack before we attacked and did we lose the element of surprise because of that?

General WICKMAN. Senator, I can't really answer that with any explicit knowledge.

We did probably give some telegraphing by inadvertent information in the press that the fleet had moved in that direction and that probably led to frenzied preparations for defense on the islands and it did lead eventually, we believe, to insertion of an additional leadership cell from Cuba.

Senator NUNN. We can ask this question of other witnesses later, but do any of the other Chiefs know whether that is, in fact, a true statement that the State Department actually gave Cuba advanced notice?

Admiral WATKINS. I do not know, Senator. It is the first time I have heard that.

Senator GOLDWATER. I saw that item and the State Department did do that. We are going to hold hearings before our committee next week on that subject.

Senator NUNN. Good. I will defer any further questions on that.

I think all of our witnesses last week and all of you have over and over again stated without being explicit about the intelligence community as such that you did not think the intelligence was adequate. I think everybody who participated echoes that.

Admiral Watkins, you made the statement which I completely agree with, that we have let our human intelligence diminish over the years and we must restore that. So, I completely agree with that.

I wonder, though, if Grenada is a good example of that. This is one of the smallest countries in the world. We had 1,000 or 1,200 American citizens on the island. The President of the United States had pointed out in front of the whole world his grave concern with Grenada 6 or 8 months ago.

As a member of the Intelligence Committee as well as this committee, it just seems to me that under those conditions, not having enough human intelligence in the world, I agree with you, but to think that we could not have better intelligence on a small country not far from our own country with that many American citizens, with that much

notice that the President was indeed not only focusing on, but very concerned about, it seems to me that that overall lack of human intelligence is not sufficient reason for not having better intelligence on Grenada.

Do you want to comment on that one way or the other?

Admiral WATKINS. I think, Senator Nunn, out of the rubble of Lebanon, out of Grenada, out of the situation in Nicaragua where we virtually have no human intelligence, out of the taking of our hostages in Iran and precursor to that which we seemed to know very little about, that the Nation will probably, with congressional help, I hope, I know the administration will be heavily involved in the review of this, that we will get our act together on international terrorism as a whole and make it a matter of national policy that we will get on with something better than we have done in the past.

This definitely focuses on the need for a real time rapid exchange of human intelligence in the hot spots of the world before things erupt and not having to go back to figure out what happened beh ıd us as we have done so often in the past.

So, my feeling is that we are not geared up to dealing with international terrorism of which this was just a modest element, but it is the same problem. Terrorist arms moving in; terrorist management moving in.

Point Salines Airfield was really a Cuban base. Why didn't we know that? We had lots of people in Grenada. Anybody could have flown down and walked in, but we didn't do that. Yet we had the elements of the problem, knowing it was a 10,000-foot runway, knowing we have seen antiaircraft batteries there before. Hardly your standard municipal airport.

All the indicators say this was in fact a potential hot spot. So, we have to start thinking in those terms and send in human intelligence resources in timely fashion.

For example, against potential adversaries like the Soviet Union we do very well. We don't do very well elsewhere in the world.

Senator NUNN. Third World countries?

Admiral WATKINS. Third World and other countries that were friendly to us such as Iran.

We did not know what the ground truth was at the grassroots level and there are times when we need to be sampling those human intelligent sources through a properly controlled human intelligence system with rapid turnaround of information from allies as well who are willing to participate in a renewed effort to cooperate in such a venture.

SAFETY OF THE MEDICAL STUDENTS

Senator NUNN. This gets to another question, again making clear that I think our overall operation was successful and that, good, we were able to get our students out of there, but Admiral McDonald testified last week that for 36 hours 225 to 250 of our medical students that we were there to protect and to rescue were under the guns of the Grenadian forces and the Cuban forces after our attack began.

He also testified that those students could have been killed had the forces of Grenada and Cuba so chosen, or taken hostage.

One of the prime purposes—very legitimate purpose of our mission there—was to indeed rescue those people.

When I find out after the fact they could have indeed been killed and we could have had 225 body bags coming back with the very people we were sent in to rescue, you have to ask hard questions and I think the Chiefs have to ask hard questions even in light of our success, about whether we have indeed honed in enough with our intelligence relations with our special forces, with our ability to go in and handle a terrorist situation.

This fortunately did not turn out to be a disaster with the hostages.

First, do you disagree with Admiral McDonald's analysis of it?

Second, what must we do to be able to improve our capability to protect American citizens in a hostage-type or terrorist-type situation?

I will ask any of the witnesses that want to answer.

Admiral WATKINS. You have a very good question, but I think we would have to go to closed hearings to answer you in detail. Let me just answer on general terms.

We were aware that Grand Anse Campus had about 200 students. We were well aware of that ahead of time. After all, we had one of the students there who was an amateur radio ham broadcasting one of the few broadcasts coming out of the region. We knew the exact status, including how many students were there.

It happens one of the students was an ex-U.S. Army major. He was telling them what to do, how to handle themselves. He beautifully led that community to understand what it was doing under the circumstances, which was very important. He allayed a lot of fears. He kept them in a posture that permitted us to do our job and take the necessary time. It was a tough geographic area because again we were trying to minimize the loss of life.

We could have come in and demolished everything around the campus and not had any problems. We felt that was not an acceptable alternative.

Senator NUNN. Could we have done that and still protected the students?

Admiral WATKINS. Yes, sir. We could. We know how to do that.

That was the Grand Anse Campus and it is located in a very heavily populated portion of the St. George's City complex. Again, we had to surgically do the job. This actually eventuated in Marine helicopters taking special Army forces in there to do the job quickly and reliably within the time period wherein sniping and shooting was going on at the Point Salinas Airfield.

We were aware of the status of the campus at the time and we could have, in an emergency, gone in quickly with special forces and done the job. But there would probably have been loss of life in the process.

Senator NUNN. You mean Admiral McDonald's statement that Cubans and Grenadians could have in fact killed those students was not accurate?

Admiral WATKINS. I believe it is accurate. But we had a radio broadcaster right in the Grand Anse Campus. We knew what his status was and we were monitoring the students' status, monitoring sniping and things that were going on around. We were ready at a moment's notice to utilize extreme measures if matters had so required.

We went down there to make sure we were not going to have Americans taken hostage in the aftermath of the bloody coup.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.

I do think we need to get into this with closed testimony from the point of view of looking ahead, from the point of view of seeing where we can improve, because I am afraid this is not the last time we are going to face this situation in a world of terrorism.

Admiral WATKINS. You recall after the aborted Iranian hostage rescue attempt there was a board that reviewed the circumstances and made certain recommendations. We followed up on those recommendations and you really should be made aware of all of the actions that the United States took which I think are significant.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Chairman TOWER. I should have said at the outset that we will get into closed hearings on this operation and go into it in some detail. It is not appropriate to discuss in open session because we don't want to compromise future missions by talking about some of the things that we did in Grenada.

I, of course, brought this up in an elocutional way to examine primarily the planning, commanding, and control aspect of it. I agree with Senator Nunn that a lot of this we want to get into and we will do so in closed session.

Senator Goldwater?

Senator GOLDWATER. Following up Senator Nunn's inquiry about intelligence, it is true that our human intelligence ability depreciated rather drastically during the period of the so-called Church Committee. It is building up now in quite a satisfactory way, but as long as we allow people living in this country, particularly certain people living around DuPont Circle, to publish the name, rank, and serial number of people doing eyeball intelligence for us, we don't attract many people to that dangerous business of going in.

We had a very good briefing on Grenada a couple years ago, but, as you know, all the details weren't there. The details that weren't there were the ones where you could go in and say this and that. We are getting better at it.

JCS DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

I have one question that any of you can answer. I may be wrong in this, but I understand that when the Joint Chiefs are going to reach a decision and they are not unanimous that the Secretary of Defense has to step in and provide the deciding vote.

Is that correct?

Admiral WATKINS. That is not correct, Senator Goldwater.

When we have any dissenting votes, it is the responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by law to report the dissenting opinion and he does that religiously.

Senator GOLDWATER. Then three out of four could make the report?

Admiral WATKINS. Yes, sir.

Witness the closely spaced basing vote that leaked out of the system, three to two. Our positions were well aired by the Chairman before the National Security Council.

Senator GOLDWATER. Thank you very much. That had been a question in my mind.

I think this is a perfect example of an operation, of a step that had been recommended very vociferously by a retired lieutenant general marine, namely, that we have lost our last two wars because of civilian control.

I brought this up before. There is nothing in the Constitution that requires civilian control. It is merely a hand me down. I don't think it has been a bad hand me down, but when we start losing wars because people in Washington who have no idea of military strategy or tactics, who have never been exposed to it, stop operations that can spell success or call for operations that are doomed, then I think this is something that we have to consider very seriously.

I don't know what the answer is. I think if we went to the American people and said the military is going to run this whole show, we would probably all get shot.

On the other hand, you men and men like you have been trained in the art of war, in the art of preventing war. I wish some of you or all of you would give some consideration to this as to what we might do about this overbearing presence of thousands and thousands of civilians in the Pentagon who can tell your forces what they can and can't do in the field.

I think all of us at this table as civilians saw this happening in Vietnam, not once but quite a few times.

I am very interested in this. I don't know what the answer is. I don't even know if there is an answer.

I think when you begin losing wars and then we win a beautiful exercise with no civilians killed, it gives us something to think about, particularly keeping the press out. Whoever dreamed that up ought to get about 14 clusters or whatever they have.

I intend to do some speaking on that, on the first amendment and what the hell it means. I don't think it means what generally our writers think it means.

Mr. Chairman, I have no other questions except why can't you call these meetings a little earlier? Why wait until half an hour before meeting? I am not being critical. I know you are tired. [Laughter.]

Chairman TOWER. Senator Goldwater, the agenda for these hearings has been established for some time. You might not read it, but you might have one of your staff members read it to you. [Laughter.]

Chairman TOWER. Senator Bingaman?

Senator BINGAMAN. I don't want to get into the middle of this exchange.

Let me just ask a couple of questions that were prompted by some of the things you folks said.

CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION

I have been struck by the tremendous number of reports that are required of various segments of the military, briefings, extent of testimony required just here on the Senate side, and I assume it is at least as extensive on the House side.

There has been reference to this by some of you off and on for the whole year. Is there something that you recommend that the Congress do to coordinate or restrict or discipline its own requests to

the Department of Defense or to your particular services for information?

I think we need to have access to the information we need, but I think if you got 535 people, each one independently requesting information instead of doing so in a coordinated way, maybe it causes you folks more trouble than is needed to still get the same information.

Admiral WATKINS. I believe where we lack oversight is perhaps on our own staff here in the Congress before those requests are made.

I believe we are supplying you with reams and reams of data that you don't need to answer either constituent complaints or others.

Perhaps we can be called and asked before we are tasked with a requirement to respond in some cases with 30 pages of machine data within 4 days. We are devoting excessive staff time in an effort to be as responsive to the Congress as we can and I don't believe you, Senator Bingaman, need all that data.

I believe you can help us a great deal if demands can be focused at the outset with some rather tough executor who can review the requests before they are heaped on the services willy-nilly.

I believe unnecessary paper work could be cut down significantly. What do we find? We find that 30 percent of the requests are programmatic in nature, the other 70 percent are constituent related. Of the 70 percent, one-third are duplicates of information already provided by my staff, but in a different format.

Of the remainder, about half are issues that need not be raised in the first place. I think some oversight here before the requests come to the service would be helpful.

Senator BINGAMAN. You mean oversight in the sense that those of us in the Senate would have one person who would try to coordinate these?

Admiral WATKINS. I am not trying to suggest any particular organizational concept over here. I am merely saying it looks to us that it is uncontrolled, coming from a variety of directions.

Does the member really want the information? You can't imagine some of the requests we get.

From one committee we received 1,600 questions for the record after the hearing. It required us several days to provide answers in great depth. I don't believe they were all useful to the members. I don't even think they were used. They may have been somehow useful to the staff, but I believe there is unnecessary waste here in Washington that we need to attack.

I believe you can help us.

Senator BINGAMAN. Does anybody else want to comment on that?

General WICKMAN. I would echo that, Senator.

There has been an enormous growth of staff support in the Congress. For legitimate reasons I am sure, but that growth has not been matched by headquarters staff capabilities in the Department of Defense.

I don't know the solution to all of this other than some more disciplining of the appetite for information and constant checking on the relevance of that information to constituent problems or to legitimate committee responsibilities.

It is growing exponentially.

I will give you one statistic that might stick in our head. We have been criticized in the Department of Defense—Jim touched on it here

in the testimony—that there are too many flag officers in the Department of Defense. We have one of the lowest number of flag officers in relationship to soldiers of countries in the world.

We have in the Army one general for 2,000 soldiers. The Soviets have one for 900.

So, great responsibility is placed on these few people who exercise oversight in the military and yet there is a growing requirement for appearances here, for testimony, and for answering questions. We have to do a thorough job, as that is our responsibility to the Congress.

We need help.

Senator GOLDWATER. Would the Senator yield at that point for a question?

Senator BINGAMAN. Sure.

Senator GOLDWATER. Can you give us collectively, how many people you have engaged in congressional liaison?

Admiral WATKINS. We can provide that for the record.

Chairman TOWER. Supply that for the record, please.

[The information follows:]

NUMBER OF NAVY PERSONNEL IN CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON

Admiral WATKINS. There is a total of 20 civilians and 53 military who are assigned permanently or temporarily to any legislative office. (Includes all personnel physically located in an office on Capitol Hill and those who work directly with Congress in the preparation and execution of congressional travels).

General GABRIEL. The Air Force has 36 officers and 20 civilians assigned to the congressional liaison function.

Admiral WATKINS. But let me give you a feel, Senator Goldwater, that it is more than congressional liaison. That really is not the issue.

For example, 245 briefings we have given the Congress since the first of the year that involved 709 naval officers.

Questions for the record, 4,500. These are extensive questions. These are not simplistic questions.

Senator NUNN. Could you break those briefings down for the record, whether initiated by the Navy or by the Congress?

There are a number of briefings that are initiated by the services themselves.

Admiral WATKINS. That is a small number. I don't know.

Senator NUNN. I don't know either. I think it would be interesting to break that down.

Admiral WATKINS. We will be pleased to do that.

[The information follows:]

NUMBER OF CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS INITIATED BY THE NAVY

Proportionally, the vast number of briefings are initiated by the Congress. A much smaller number, less than 20 percent, are a follow on to preliminary staff interaction which results in a mutual conclusion that a briefing would be useful. Less than 5 percent of congressional briefings are initially offered by the Navy, but even these are usually in response to an expression of interest such as a news report, a publication of remarks in the Congressional Record or staff discussions.

AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING FUNDING

Senator BINGAMAN. Let me ask on another issue that at least a couple of you mentioned and that is on this automated data processing capability and the funding that we provide.

One frustration that I have had is that it is very difficult to get a fix on which of the things that are requested are really priority items.

I can sympathize at this point with Admiral Watkins about the fact that we knocked $30 million out of funding for the computer capability for automated data processing.

This is the first that I have heard about that being a priority within the overall budget request. I don't know if anything can be done or if that is purely a political dance that goes on here every year.

It is difficult for me to know where the priorities are when we see the budget request that comes over. If I had known that was a priority, I would have done what little I could to see to it that that funding remained in your budget.

Admiral WATKINS. I think one of the difficulties with automatic data processing, Senator Bingaman, is that it is hard for most people to say it is essential to our war fighting capability. Hit them with a computer?

So, it is difficult to generate any excitement about it. ADP is probably the most complicated bureaucratic morass here in Washington: how to deal with automatic data processing. There is an explosion of technology and computers all are tied into it. There are more complications in the ADP procurement process than in any other procurement process for equipment. You have embedded computers, non-embedded computers, all sorts of things are changing.

We are in antiquity in the military in general because we have been unable to stay up with technology through any new scheme of managing ADP. It is a major problem and needs a lot of attention.

It is not just within the military. It is the congressional oversight of the various committees that gets into automatic data processing and the intense agony that everyone has in dealing with the bureaucracy associated with computers.

Senator BINGAMAN. I am just looking at some of the reports of the Committee on Appropriations dealing with the Defense Department. They indicate that something over $900 million is spent leasing general purpose computer hardware by the Government, or was in 1982, and about 60 percent of that was by the Department of Defense.

Are there any significant efforts going on to unify or coordinate the automatic, data-processing functions or capabilities of the various services?

I asked that question of Paul Thayer at a hearing a couple weeks ago and his response was that that attempt to coordinate across the services was not in the cards, was the way he put it, because it was just too difficult to get that kind of thing done.

I don't know if that is the case or if some have different ways.

General GABRIEL. I don't have any knowledge that we have attempted that seriously.

I do know that we are leasing, and I think we should be, we have to be. I gave you the example of Wright-Patterson Air Force Logistics Command, where we have those old processors doing batch processing. It takes 5 or 6 years leadtime nowadays, by the time you commit yourself and buy computes. And if there is any kind of delay, by the time you get the computer out in the field it is already out of date with technology.

So, we need to find some way to improve that situation. In the meantime, we have to lease in order to be able to do the job.

To answer your specific question, I don't have any knowledge we have tried to coordinate the leasing among the services.

General WICKMAN. Let me just add a footnote onto that, Senator.

I am not speaking with a joint perspective, but in the Army we have tried to centralize the ADP business at installations throughout the United States and overseas.

We have now begun regional establishment of our computer structure that will service a number of installations—Project Viable. We capture, therefore, the best of technology and we can save resources for the Government in terms of people and funding level. We have one of these, for example, at Fort Belvoir that serves the region on the east coast.

There is an effort at least in the Army, and I am sure the other services also, to reduce the antiquated computers and the extensive proliferation of them, and to capture new technology.

That may eventually lead to some degree of inter-service cooperation in the use of them.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Kennedy?

MILITARY MISSION STATEMENT

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, want to take the occasion to congratulate the members of the Joint Chiefs, to the extent they were involved in exercising the leadership and responsibility in the military operation in Grenada.

I would be interested if you could review the goal of that operation as you understood them.

Admiral WATKINS. Senator Kennedy, we didn't necessarily come prepared today to give you a detailed mission statement. Rather, we have focused on improving the process in Government. But I will do the best I can under the circumstances.

There had been requests of the United States by the six members of the eastern Caribbean states. Grenada had had a bloody coup. They had no government. We had indications from our own Ambassador of a potential threat in terms of hostage taking, to impose political leverage on the United States.

All of us have had emblazed on our foreheads the situation that we faced in Iran not too many years ago, and I would hope that our intelligence and our capability to deal with similar events was such that we would not allow a hostage situation to happen again. We had watched the buildup in Grenada rather tangentially over the past 2 years.

The decision was made by the national command authority to take the necessary action to insure that the safety of our American students down there, in particular, and other American citizens were protected and that we were not going to fall into the hostage taking situation that would have again been an embarrassment to the United States.

There was enough sporadic information coming in from a variety of sources including our friends in the eastern Caribbean states that indicated it was time to move.

So, my feeling is that the objectives there, as reasonably stated time and time again by the President, were the same ones we actually faced when we arrived.

We translated those political requirements into a military mission statement. That was to proceed to the area, secure our students at the various campuses in the southern part of the island, insure their safety so they could not be taken hostage, and do everything we could to set up a mechanism to establish a legitimate government that included protection of Governor-General Scoon who had been taken captive and was being held against his will at a certain site that we were able to secure very rapidly with our personnel, so that he could form a legitimate government in the aftermath of this no-government situation we found in Grenada.

I could provide for the record the specific terms of the mission if that would be helpful to you.

I would hesitate to state them here today because I could not state them in clear legal terms as they should be stated.

Senator KENNEDY. Fine.

Could we have that for the record, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman TOWER. Yes. We will get that for the record.

[The information follows:]

Admiral WATKINS. [Deleted.]

MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN GRENADA

Chairman TOWER. If I may intervene for just a moment, I think before you came in Senator Nunn and I addressed ourselves to the operational aspect of Grenada and we do intend to have closed hearings on that. I think it is necessary to have closed hearings, and we don't want to talk about it in open session. That will be done in the future. We will get more detailed information.

Senator KENNEDY. Could I just ask then, what you see as the current military objective there, and have you achieved all the military objectives which had been established in your mission statement?

Admiral WATKINS. We virtually accomplished all objectives, Senator Kennedy.

We have just reviewed the plan for extraction of military forces in the shortest time possible. We are proceeding down that path now, trying to find the right balance between the security of the island, the civil needs of the people there, and making sure that all of those who want to leave the island have left the island.

We coordinate very closely now with the State Department and the other agencies to insure that we are going to pull out no sooner than we need to pull out to insure stability in the region, but in the shortest possible time and I would hope we are talking a few weeks before we will be totally out.

That is our objective. I think we can accomplish that with an aggressive approach and that is the approach we are taking right now.

Senator KENNEDY. You anticipated my next question which is how long you think it will take to achieve the objectives at the present time?

What can you tell us about that now as we have had a period of stability on the island and it appears from the announcements that

have been made that there has been a termination of any resistance from a military point of view?

Admiral WATKINS. From a military point of view, we are in the final stage of putting together our extraction plan now. It will include the proper addressal of reconnaissance, perhaps Navy presence, perhaps continental-based ready forces that could respond in the event that Mr. Castro decided to take some retaliatory action.

We don't want to walk out and have the Grenadians become concerned again. We are trying to find that mechanism right now. It is the unanimous opinion of the Joint Chiefs, and I think shared by the Secretary of Defense, that our objective is to get our forces out in the quickest possible time consistent with those objectives.

I think we are 2 or 3 weeks away from having the last military combat force out of there. There may be other agencies required to stay there and assist as requested by the council set up to operate the interim government.

General WICKHAM. Senator Kennedy, we didn't want to leave a nascent insurgency in the jungles there. There is a ferreting out through aggressive patrolling to find if there are any Cubans left, to find out if there are any caches of weapons left that ought to be unearthed and turned over to the proper authority.

There is a degree of caution. We are concerned about moving out as rapidly as is feasible consistent with political circumstances.

Senator KENNEDY. Is there any indication of resistance now, as a result of these patrols in these outreach programs?

Have you drawn any conclusions from them?

General WICKHAM. Senator, I don't have the latest reports on whether there are snipers here or there. Active patrolling is underway.

That island is covered with rather arduous mountainous country and jungle canopy. It takes time to check people, to find out whether there has been anyone in this particular area, what about this abandoned location?

We need to patrol. That will take a bit of time. We are not dragging our feet in any way.

Senator KENNEDY. You don't see any reason, at least on the basis of these surveys, that we couldn't comply with what the admiral has said with regard to the 2 or 3 weeks?

General WICKHAM. No, sir, no problem.

SPOKESMAN FOR THE UNIFIED COMMANDS

Senator KENNEDY. General Wickham, I was interested in the statement made on page 4 of your statement with regard to the Unified Command. Perhaps you would be good enough to elaborate a bit on that, if you would, given the kind of responsibility that the Chiefs have to the various services themselves.

The Unified Command has the overall responsibility in terms of the planning and strategy. If we could elaborate about whom you believe to be the principal spokesman for the Unified Command either at the chief's level or in terms of the Secretary of Defense.

General WICKHAM. There are multiple dimensions of that. The CINC themselves speak for their own resource needs in multiple ways.

One is a quarterly letter to the Secretary of Defense wherein they lay out their resourcing problems and the issues of overriding importance to them.

The Secretary reads those personally and responds to every one. Those letters are also available to the Joint Chiefs and to the Joint Staff. So, we respond to them.

Second, the CINC's come in periodically and brief their concerns to the Defense Resources Board, so there is a cognizance drawn from that.

Third, the CINC's involve the Joint Staff in consultations on issues that are of importance to them or of importance to the Chiefs.

Now, as a formal mechanism for someone speaking for the CINC's when they are absent at a Resources Board meeting, or an NSC meeting, for that matter, the Chairman speaks for them based on knowledge of their concerns and they, in turn, the CINC's, know what was represented and what came out of it. If they have objection or want to further add information afterward, they can do that.

I think there are procedures to allow for adequate revelation of CINC's interests.

I have been in the business a number of years and I think the system now is far better in terms of drawing out CINC's concerns and involving them in the decision process without taking them away from their primary responsibility of being ready to deal with a crisis situation.

Senator KENNEDY. My time has expired. If I could have one last question, Mr. Chairman, I would appreciate it.

Chairman TOWER. Go ahead.

Senator KENNEDY. It appears obvious that the services are represented on the Joint Chiefs, but the question is about whether the Unified Command would appear initially to have more to do with weapon needs in those respective areas rather than the overall issues of strategy and planning. Clearly they don't have as strong a spokesman as the services at the Joint Chiefs level, whether that is adequate or not given what you understand as the command structure.

I gather from what you say there are sufficient vehicles for their input?

General WICKHAM. Let me touch on that. When we put together policy issues other than weapons, as you point out, the CINC's are consulted.

When a paper is being prepared in the Joint Staff for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they go to the CINC; here is what we are thinking, we would like your input on that.

That input is made known to the Chiefs. It is discussed in our meetings.

I think there are adequate systemic ways of bringing forth CINC involvement in the development of policy, in the development of programatic needs, in the development of priorities, and in the development of overall strategy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SUPPORT FOR THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE

Chairman TOWER. Let me say a word about a subject Senator Kennedy touched on.

I visited with the prime ministers of the eastern Caribbean states last Sunday.

They raised a caution about premature withdrawal of our forces and all suggested strongly, even after our combat elements are out, the multinational force will require some support from us in the way of communications resources, vertical lift, engineers, technical assistance, and training because the multinational force, made up as it is from the paramilitary, military, and police organizations of these Caribbean states, is not really prepared to cope.

That is something I think we have to recognize and be frank about.

As a matter of fact, some of the eastern constabulary personnel in the British tradition don't ordinarily even carry arms.

So, I think we ought to think in terms of being able to provide some kind of support activity even though we have taken our combat elements out. That is a subject we will get on at another time.

COMPATIBILITY OF COMMAND AUTHORITY AND SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY

Let me ask first, General Kelley, whether or not you believe that your command authority is compatible with the responsibility and accountability that you were held for in the operations and activities of your service.

I think General Kelley has had recent experience that there is a general perception in the Congress and in the country that the Commandant of the Marine Corps will answer for the adequacy of the security measures in Beirut, but at the same time is not part of the chain of command.

I cite that simply as an example that comes to mind.

I would first like to ask General Kelley whether he thinks his command authority is compatible with the responsibility and accountability he has and then I will ask the other chiefs to comment.

General KELLEY. Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that, as far as I am concerned, irrespective of what the law says and what diagrams say, my responsibility to Marines is total and absolute. As the commandant, I assume all responsibility, irrespective of what chains of command might indicate. However, with that said, I have no problem with the chain of command as we know it today with the establishment of the unified commanders who are primarily responsible for geographical areas.

I don't believe you can hold any service chief totally responsible for the worldwide commitment of his forces. That would be a physical impossibility. Moreover, I think it would not provide for the compatibility, if you will, of the services working in harmony—one with the other.

So, I totally subscribe to the law as it is currently written in which we have a unified command system on the one hand and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the other.

Chairman TOWER. Admiral Watkins?

Admiral WATKINS. I agree with General Kelley, Mr. Chairman.

I think that in our dual hatting to train and equip, ready the forces for fighting as the Chief of Naval Operations, in my case, and then

in my responsibility as the principal adviser on Naval matters to the President, Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that I have two very compatible avenues to work and I work them both at all times.

Months ago there were threats to the Naval forces in the close proximity of Beirut. I did not wait nor did the rest of us wait as service chiefs to make inquiry. I made inquiry as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We all do.

We concern ourselves, we make recommendations during our meetings to send the proper directive off to the unified commanders to make inquiry as to what is going on.

All of these things are done routinely and I believe working both sides is probably the optimus arrangement because we have a lot more people worrying about our sailors than we otherwise would. That is the right thing to do. Most of our chains of command fully understand that and know that we are helping both from the administrative side as well as the operational side and not trying to get ourselves in the bureaucratic situation where somehow I could absolve myself of my responsibilities for the safe operation of those ships in close proximity to potential combat operations.

Chairman TOWER. General Wickham?

General WICKHAM. Senator, the dual-hat arrangement that each service chief has helps to handle the problem that General Kelley pointed out.

Army forces are deployed overseas. Forty-three percent of the Army is overseas under unified command. Those unified commanders exercise operational control over the forces for wartime purposes and planning for operations, but the Department of the Army retains the requirement to deal with them in administrative and logistics support and, if you will, oversight on safety and all of the issues that Jim Watkins talked about.

So, the loop is closed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff with service chiefs that are double hatted.

We do not give up on our responsibility. Just as P.X. said, I, as Chief of Staff of the Army, am deeply concerned about every soldier who is entrusted to my care even if he is under the operational control of the unified commander.

Chairman TOWER. General Gabriel?

General GABRIEL. Mr. Chairman, I agree with the unified commander plan and the way the world is split up with those commanders.

We deal directly, as General Wickham said, with our components. We don't shuck any responsibility there.

In every case, as Admiral Watkins has said, whenever there is a threat, we go on the line in two different directions, both through the JCS and through our service hat.

It is more than just our job as a chief being to organize, train and equip. It is through our hat that we are concerned with every airman out there. Like the Army, we have about a quarter of our forces overseas.

Chairman TOWER. Let me reserve the balance of my time and defer to Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would hope I can get an answer to these questions from each of you, yes or no, and realizing you may want to add to the answer for the record, if you choose.

General Rogers testified and Admiral McDonald and General Gorman agreed as CINC's, but I think Admiral McDonald and General Gorman took exception to one of the proposals. General Rogers proposed five, four of which were endorsed by each.

I would like each of you to answer yes or.

General Gabriel, the first proposal was to put the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in the chain of command.

General Gabriel, do you agree or disagree?

General GABRIEL. I agree with that.

Senator NUNN. Second, to make the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs a member of the National Security Council.

Do you agree or disagree with that one?

General GABRIEL. I don't think it is necessary, but I don't object.

Senator NUNN. The third one is to create a Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

General GABRIEL. No.

Senator NUNN. Fourth, to remove restrictions on the size and tenure of the Joint Staff?

General GABRIEL. Yes, I agree.

Senator NUNN. Fifth, to formalize the interface of the CINC's with the Defense Resources Board.

General GABRIEL. I don't think that it is necessary to formalize it. I think it is working very well.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much.

General Wickman, I will state them again.

General WICKMAN. I have them, sir.

I think that it is necessary to put the Chairman in the National Security Council. All we are doing there is formalizing a de facto system.

Provide for a Deputy Chairman. I don't think it is necessary. The rotational system that exists now, for example, for 3 months I am the Acting Chairman when the Chairman is gone, and Jim has been, so that works very well. We are not sure what the duties would be of the Deputy Chairman and how you structure his responsibilities.

Remove Joint Staff restrictions necessary to get beyond the 400 and to formalize——

Senator NUNN. In other words, you agree with that?

General WICKMAN. Yes, sir, and to formalize the CINC's action with the DRB process.

I think it is substantially structured to involve them.

The answer to that is really the Secretary of Defense, does he want to formalize it or not. I think they have adequate opportunity to involve themselves now.

Senator NUNN. Admiral Watkins, I will put these to you.

First, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in the chain of command.

Admiral WATKINS. Yes.

Senator NUNN. You agree with that?

Admiral WATKINS. Yes.

Senator NUNN. Second, make the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a member of the NSC?

Admiral WATKINS. I am ambivalent. I echo what General Wickham says. He sits in on those meetings any time military forces are involved and his position is very heavily weighed. I see his membership as legitimatizing what already is the practice when decisions are required involving military forces. Whether he has time to sit in those councils at other times may be a question, but I would not object to that.

Senator NUNN. Third, create a Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs?

Admiral WATKINS. I am opposed to it. We tried desperately last year with a former group of Joint Chiefs to see if we could make such a concept work.

General Gabriel was there with us. After 6 months deliberation and with a very objective look at this, saying: All right, we have a Deputy Chairman, let's try to make it work. The result was that even those who thought we should have one fell off the band wagon. We simply could not make it work.

I think we could provide further discussion on that.

Senator NUNN. Fine. I am just trying to get back to Senator Tower.

Remove restrictions on the size and tenure of the Joint Chiefs?

Admiral WATKINS. Yes, sir, we should.

Senator NUNN. You agree with that?

Admiral WATKINS. Yes.

Senator NUNN. Fifth, formalize the interface of the CINC's with the Defense Resources Board.

Admiral WATKINS. No; it is not necessary. Furthermore, there is an additional element of the House passed bill that permits CINC's to comment upon Joint Staff reports before those reports or recommendations are submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Either of these provisions would debilitate the process and complicate the bureaucracy tremendously when it is not necessary.

Senator NUNN. I would like any remark you may have on the House-passed bill that you didn't go into in your prepared testimony, if you could furnish that for the record.

Admiral WATKINS. I would like to furnish that for the record.

Senator NUNN. I hate to load the record up further, Admiral, after your admonition. Only if it is necessary.

Admiral WATKINS. I feel the need, Senator Nunn, if you are going to pass the House bill the way it is now, it is needed.

Senator NUNN. I am not asking for another briefing, Admiral.

General Kelley?

General KELLEY. I am a new kid on the block. I did not get the list.

Senator NUNN. First, put the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in the chain of command.

General KELLEY. Only with the possible caveat that, when he is in the chain of command, he is not there as an individual, but as the spokesman for the corporate body—the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator NUNN. You made that clear in your testimony.

Thank you.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as a member of the NSC?

General KELLEY. I would have no objection from a military viewpoint but with the same strong caveat that he is acting on behalf of the other members of the Joint Chiefs.

Senator NUNN. Third, create a Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

General KELLEY. I would be unalterably opposed to that.

Senator NUNN. Fourth, remove restrictions on size and tenure of the Joint Staff?

General KELLEY. I would favor that.

Senator NUNN. Fifth, formalize the interface of the CINC's with the Defense Resources Board?

General KELLEY. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are not formal members. I think there should be a lot more investigation of the Defense Resources Board before I could comment yes or no. I am not a member, so I would be hard pressed to suggest that a CINC be a member.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, sir.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I understand that most of the questions that I have in mind have been asked so I will not repeat them.

General Wickham, General Kelley, Admiral Watkins, General Gabriel, I am glad to have you here. I want to commend you for the fine job you are doing in your respective positions.

I would like to say how proud I am of the way our servicemen performed in Grenada.

I wholeheartedly back the President on this move. I think it was the sensible thing to do and I am very proud of the results accomplished by all the services.

I am very sorry for the loss of life. In the words of Pat Buchanan, "More was done for human rights in 48 hours than the previous administration accomplished in 4 years."

I think this was a very important mission.

RESTRUCTURING ARMED SERVICES' ROLES AND MISSIONS

I have just one question. Each of you can answer very briefly.

How would you restructure roles and missions to more efficiently utilize manpower and resources?

General KELLEY. I will answer that with a quote from a book that was given to me and General Wickham.

Three of us at this table were commissioned in the same year in which the Department of Defense distributed a book entitled "The Armed Forces Officer."

The book addresses a fundamental issue that we all should recognize when we talk about roles, missions, jointness, and all those other fancy buzz words:

> The fact remains that the services are not alike, that no one can make them alike. The retention by each service of its separate character, customs, and competence is essential to conserve our national military power. Unification has not altered this basic proposition.
>
> The first requirement of a unified establishment is moral soundness in each of its integral parts without which there can be no soundness at all. On the

question of fundamental loyalty, the officer who loves every other service just as much as his own will have just as much actual virtue as the man who loves other women as much as his own wife.

[Laughter.]

I would not change roles and missions, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Very interesting answer.

[Laughter.]

Admiral WATKINS. I think the roles and missions are well defined. I would not change.

General WICKHAM. I agree. I would not change roles and missions. You have very competent armed services out there with extraordinary tradition and history and esprit de corps.

I think you have Joint Chiefs here who, all of us have said in our statements, work very effectively together. I think the Nation is well served by the system that has evolved just as our system of Government with its three branches has evolved.

It is cumbersome. It is time consuming, but it has served the American people in our 200-plus years of history very well.

Senator THURMOND. General Gabriel, is your answer also "Me, too"?

General GABRIEL. Yes; it is. We have had a lot of experience with this.

I think over the years it has boiled down to about the best we can have. It works well. I don't think you should fix it as long as it is working so well.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Kennedy, do you have any further questions? I have some, but I will defer to you first.

JOINT VERSUS SERVICE DECISIONS

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just as a matter of curiosity, have any of you experienced the situation where a recommendation might be made to the Joint Chiefs on behalf of your particular service which you, as an individual member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have posed?

Have there been any occasions where you have felt that your responsibility as a member of the JCS would bring you to a conclusion that the recommendation would not be in the interest of your service?

General WICKHAM. Let me start out by answering that, sir.

I have been a member of the Joint Chiefs since June. On at least two occasions I have overruled my staff in joint deliberations and have gone with what I thought was right around the table, assessing the issue, myself, main issue.

Senator KENNEDY. Could you illustrate?

General WICKHAM. I would prefer not to in this open session.

Chairman TOWER. I don't think we should require that.

Senator KENNEDY. Are there examples you can give in open session, not in regard to national security items, but in terms of weapons strategy.

General WICKHAM. One dealt with a unified command plan and the structure of that.

Another dealt with an issue of strategic guidance.

Senator KENNEDY. What about the other chiefs?

Admiral WATKINS. I have the same experience, Senator Kennedy. I don't know what could be provided for the record. I would prefer not to note the kind of internal deliberations we have in the Joint Chiefs. These are done in executive session many times.

I have seen all the chiefs down here in recent months make decisions where clearly the staff papers, to which we all have access, are at variance with the positions we have taken.

Yesterday we came to a very interesting conclusion on the whole issue of space command for the future. I think it was a very responsible position and it wasn't the position that any chief had taken prior to coming into the debate.

After the debate we all shifted gears and found a proper answer, it was not a three-humped camel. We are not being forced to come to decisions in concert for the vote to be 5 to 0.

Whether it is employment of forces, whether it is policy, whether it is recommendations on closely spaced basing, we come together and find the proper answer in concert, which is our objective, if we can, but if not, to have our positions well expressed up through the system.

No problems with that at all.

General GABRIEL. The same thing as General Wickham mentioned concerning the unified command. Also, I had to turn my staff around a bit on another subject recently which we shouldn't discuss here.

As Admiral Watkins mentioned, just yesterday, we saw one of the best examples of joint national interest overriding service positions. I applaud the diplomacy of each of the chiefs on that occasion.

Senator KENNEDY. On the issue of the space command can you tell us what the recommendation will be? Will we have a unified command or will each service have their own command?

General WICKHAM. We really should not do that, sir. That is still under consideration and I think it would be inappropriate for us to comment on it before this body.

Senator KENNEDY. So that I understand what the issue is, will each of the services have their own separate command or will there be a unified command?

Is that issue in house?

Admiral WATKINS. The issue is how can the Nation best coordinate the plan for employment of space resources in the future. Some of that employment responsibility will fall to the services and to defense as a whole.

It has to be integrated with private sector, it has to be integrated with a group of agencies, and our feeling was that we as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to insure that in 1984 and in the future with all the systems we have coming down the line that we provide the very best organization structure we can and make those recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and he in turn to the President as to how we would manage those resources, and we have done that.

In other words, we are taking what we have in hand and what we expect to have in hand and are trying to come to grips with how to manage that more effectively in the future as the world shifts its focus to a third dimension, space.

Chairman TOWER. When do you expect we will have that before the Congress?

I suppose it will be a recommendation made by the Secretary of Defense?

Admiral WATKINS. I would expect that we will have considerable debate with the Secretary of Defense. It will then be passed to the President for his review before we are permitted to present it to the Hill.

How that is going to take place between now and, say, the opening of the next session of Congress, I don't know, Senator.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PERIODIC REVIEW OF ROLES AND MISSIONS

Chairman TOWER. Turning to roles and missions for a moment, I have a sort of three-barrel question here.

Is there any regular periodic effort within your respective offices to examine, from time to time, the present assignment of roles and missions?

Should there be such periodic examination, and is there any joint effort by the services to review this assignment of roles and missions?

Admiral Watkins, you can kick it off.

Admiral WATKINS. We don't have an annual roles and missions conference, Senator Tower, but I have to say in the budget development, the Defense Resources Board procedure, our debate with the Congress and the like, we essentially mold the roles and missions so they do evolve and they do change.

For example, today the Air Force and the Navy, through a joint agreement and through the assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are tasking our unified commanders to find more effective means of combining our forces, both in support of the conflict ashore and the war at sea.

This is a roles and missions shift in a sense, but we are doing it not in the context of meeting and discussing it, but getting on with what do we need to fight our forces better and, out of that, roles and missions changes are taking place.

I think it has been one of the most aggressive sorts of effort that I have seen in many years because I believe world instability is driving all of our thinking toward better preparedness to get our forces ready to deter conflict and certainly be able to perform well if called upon.

There is new impetus, if you will, and a catalyst there to force ourselves to do the kind of thinking that led to the successful operations in Grenada.

So, I believe that if we try to formalize or institutionalize the process, it could be very unwieldy and debilitating.

We, in fact, do change. I think this group of chiefs has probably changed more than I have seen in the past, perhaps spurred on by the word "space."

Chairman TOWER. General Wickham?

General WICKHAM. The DRB process, I believe, forces a good degree of review of roles and missions through the programmatic dimensions.

General Gabriel indicated that this year for the first time the Air Force and the Army developed POM's together because there is a good deal of interaction there in relation to the services. We have just kicked off a study group that will over the next several months make an exhaustive review of how we can avoid some duplication of roles and missions.

That may lead to some consolidation of effort and it may lead to some clear lines of commitment in the way of programmatic responsibilities.

The Marine Corps also has participated in our systems acquisition activity where we are working for joint equipment.

I think there is a jointness about our programmatic activity that unearths duplication in roles and missions and helps us move toward a better accommodation without, of course, blurring the lines between air, ground and sea power.

Chairman TOWER. General Gabriel?

General GABRIEL. In the effort that General Wickham just mentioned—roles and missions are not the driving factors.

It is who can do what, what is the smartest way to do it and most affordable way to do it. We have really thrown out the roles and missions issues, locked our people up and asked them to give us the answer.

Admiral Watkins already mentioned what we are doing with Grenada. There is another example today in the Mediterranean—a joint exercise with the Navy. The F–14's and E–2C's work with the AWAC's and the F–15's in defense of the carrier battle group.

That is the kind of thing that we don't worry about in roles and missions. If we can help in any way in terms of surveillance for the fleet, if we can help in any way in terms of air defense, we will do it.

It is working well and the more we do this, of course, the more we find out there are other things that we can help each other on without bumping into the parochial problems of the past.

Chairman TOWER. General Kelley?

General KELLEY. First, Mr. Chairman, I have to say that I have never seen a crowded battlefield, and I don't think that the subject is necessarily a change of roles and missions. I am very content with the roles and missions and have looked at them privately. We have also looked at them within our own service.

I think what we are doing now is harmonizing the capabilities of the four services into a far more effective fighting organization that can do the job. So, I don't think the subject is necessarily a change of roles and missions but rather a continued emphasis on this harmonization of capabilities that exist within the Armed Forces of the United States. I think we will have all those capabilities now. The trick is putting them together in perfect harmony so that we do have a synergistic effect.

DUPLICATION OF FUNCTIONS WITHIN EACH SERVICE

Chairman TOWER. Turning now to the duplication of functions. Each of you direct a staff of several hundred people which in some large measure duplicates the functions performed by the staff of the individual service Secretaries.

For example, each service has an Assistant Secretary having primary responsibility for personnel management and the staff of that Assistant Secretary is a major portion of the Secretary's staff.

Yet, at the same time each of you has a Deputy Chief of Personnel with a staff far larger than that of the Assistant Secretary.

What function does that Assistant Secretary and his staff perform which cannot be performed better by the Deputy Chief of Personnel and his staff?

General Gabriel, we will start with your end of the table.

General GABRIEL. We look to the Assistant Secretaries on the Secretariat to provide us with the policy guidance, and we work very closely with them. They interface with OSD and help interpret the guidance coming down from above.

I think that is working fairly well.

Chairman TOWER. I am driving at whether or not there is unnecessary duplication of function.

General GABRIEL. I don't think you can say that you couldn't do it with fewer people in one area or another. We have a lot more in the Air Staff. We have about 2,900 across the board, and he has a little over 300 in the Secretariat.

Obviously, there is some duplication there, but I think it tends to reinforce.

We have not lately run a manpower study to see if we are as efficient as we should be. I know there are some areas where they are most useful. You mentioned manpower.

Chairman TOWER. I just mentioned that as an example. There are other examples.

General GABRIEL. There are areas like research, development, and acquisition. In particular, there we get important help from the Secretariat and they help the Secretary, of course, in his responsibility in in acquisition.

They also help us a great deal in our interface with Congress, with your staffers here in particular.

So, whether or not we are as efficient as we could be—probably not. I suspect there is some duplication there where we could make some savings.

Chairman TOWER. General Wickham?

General WICKHAM. Yes, sir; I think there is some duplication. It is inevitable. Even within the uniformed staffs there is probably some duplication between what we do and what the Joint Staff does.

We need to work harder to try to clean that up. I do believe that the civilian Secretariat, as small as it is, does provide essentially a valuable service. I have seen it in the past few months.

To bring up the manpower issue our Assistant Secretary for Manpower and the civilian staff he has there brought to bear on the women in the Army issue, a sensitive issue, some refreshing perspectives that the uniformed staff would not have thought of and political insights that we were not prepared to recognize. I feel from their involvement it led to a better solution to that sensitive issue.

So, I find that it is a valuable organization. If we didn't have the Secretariats in the services, we probably would have to invent something like it to help the service chiefs.

Chairman TOWER. Admiral Watkins?

Admiral WATKINS. I fall into the same camp as the two previous speakers on that question, Mr. Chairman.

I think I could never certify that there is not an element of redundancy, nor would I sit here and say either the staff on the Secretariat side or on my side is optimally sized.

We have been cut various times over the years. We have fought those cuts. My experience as Chief of Naval Personnel a few years ago was that the Secretariat was extremely valuable to me. They provided a special insight, they provided the mechanisms to deal with the civilian control of the military in a very important area that I don't believe the Navy uniformed members could have solved alone.

We had a great deal of help in those tough years from very dedicated people. I saw more dedication in the manpower side, frankly, than I saw in some of the other sides because they were fighting hard for us. I believe a certain amount of that redundancy is probably necessary, but I certainly would be the first to say if we are fighting each other in a redundant fashion, we should eliminate one side or the other.

I have not seen that with the Secretariat in this particular case, nor in the manpower area have I seen it in the past. It is also particularly valuable in shipbuilding and logistics in the Navy.

The insight that the Secretary himself and his staff have given us into improving our shipbuilding program and aviation program has been impressive and provided a new business sense about which the uniformed member is somewhat naive.

So, I find they are extremely valuable. I believe they lost something in the British process when they eliminated their individual service Secretaries. I believe you lose a spokesman and advocate that is essential as the civilian counterpart of the uniformed side, to insure civilian control over the military.

I believe that identity should remain clear. That advocacy is helpful and we should not eliminate it. I find we are doing the right thing to have that service secretariat. Obviously cuts could be made for specifics, but I don't think any of that is necessary now.

Chairman TOWER. General Kelley?

General KELLEY. Mr. Chairman, I have obviously not done a manpower survey of the Secretariat. I apologize for not giving you a direct answer, but I can measure it in a different way.

Normally when you have unnecessary overlap and duplication, you have people who are meddlesome and troublesome, and I have not seen that.

I have seen in the service secretariat staff people who have been helpful and who have been forthcoming and who have carried our flag.

Therefore, I must conclude they are performing a very valuable function. Whether or not there are members who are redundant, I am not qualified to answer.

General GABRIEL. Mr. Chairman, could I add one thing?

I forgot one important area where there is not duplication of function; it is really sharing of function. The Secretary of the Air Force has his public affairs office and his legislative liaison office that we share together, they serve the same function.

General WICKHAM. It is the same in the Army. There is a shared responsibility and shared staff in those two areas.

Chairman TOWER. Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your appearance here today. I think you have given us some extremely useful testimony. I believe you have all lived up to your promise to be candid with us in giving us your professional opinion. I appreciate that very much.

I hope we can come up with some useful legislation after we conclude these hearings.

Thank you very much for being here today.

The committee will suspend for 5 minutes before we proceed to other business.

[The following questions were submitted by Senator Dan Quayle to be answered for the hearing record:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN QUAYLE

ASSIGNMENT OF OFFICERS TO THE JOINT STAFF

Senator QUAYLE. If you find yourself in a situation where you have a requirement for an O–5 and O–6 officer in a key logistics or operations position in both the Joint Staff and in your service staff, how do you make the assignment decision?

Assuming you had one clearly superior officer, would you assign him to JCS or keep him on your staff?

Who makes such a decision and what guidance is provided regarding Joint Staff assignments?

ARMY

General WICKHAM. As a general rule, the Army assigns only top quality people to the OJCS. We recognize our responsibility to support the Joint Staff and the benefits that accrue to the Army from providing top quality personnel for those key positions. We try to nurture broad professional experience in our staff officers and prefer, when feasible, to assign officers to the OJCS who have already served with the Army Staff. Joint duty is valuable to an Army officer and, as you know, is a requirement for selection to O–7. The specific assignments are handled by our personnel staff, although for a key billet on the Joint Staff, the CSA or the Operations Deputy might be involved in the decision. The OJCS is filled at 100 percent of authorization and all positions are nominative. In the nominative process, the OJCS may elect to reject an individual nominated by the Army. Moreover, approximately 20 percent of their requirements are filled with "by-name requests."

NAVY

Admiral WATKINS. The assignment decision is based on a comparison of the individual officer's qualifications and background to the experience level required for the billet.

All other things being equal, I would not hesitate to assign him to JCS. Assignment decisions are almost never this clear. Experience possessed by the individual and required by the billet, needs of the officer for career progression and other related matters must always be considered.

The assignment decision is made in the Naval Military Personnel Command (NMPC). Formal guidance for assignments to the JCS is contained in NMPC internal directives. Our goal is 100% manning of the JCS—and we are meeting that goal. JCS is manned at 100% while there are currently 68 gapped officer billets in the OPNAV organization.

AIR FORCE

General GABRIEL. Air Force policy is to assign only our outstanding and highly motivated officers to the JCS. This policy is contained in Air Force directives, and our personnel managers are thoroughly familiar with the guidance. Candidates are identified by the Air Force Manpower and Personnel Center and nominated

to the JCS. The final decision on an officer's acceptability is made by JCS. Experience and performance data are provided for use in the decision process. In determining whether an officer will be assigned to the Joint Staff or the Air Staff, a number of factors are taken into consideration, to include previous assignment background.

MARINE CORPS

General KELLEY. We are fortunate to have a sufficient number of high quality officers in the grades of Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel to enable us to fill key positions on both the Joint Staff and my staff, without degrading our operational forces.

Responding to the hypothetical case of having one clearly superior officer, that officer's assignment to the Joint Staff or to my staff would necessarily depend on the requirements of the positions being considered. Thus the assignment would be made to that position with requirements that are most closely matched by the officer's professional qualifications.

I personally review the assignment of each Colonel in the Marine Corps and the Director of Personnel Management, a Major General, personally reviews the assignment of each Lieutenant Colonel. The Marine Corps has always placed a high priority on insuring that high quality officers are assigned to the Joint Staff. The specific requirements for each assignment are provided in the Joint Staff Requisition and my guidance is that we insure those prerequisites are fully met.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee proceeded to other business.]

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